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AFfER "lllDING THE BALL" IS OVER:
HOW THE NLRB MUST CHANGE ITS APPROACH TO
DECISION-MAKING
Michael J. Hayes·
I.

INTRODUCTION

Is the National Labor Relations Board (the NLRB or the Board),
the agency that oversees federal labor law, still relevant? When this
question is considered, as it frequently is by scholars, lawyers and
officials of the NLRB itself, the focus typically is on whether changes
in the workplace, the economy and society are diminishing the
relevance of the Board. l But there is a new and more immediate threat
•
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S. 1985,
Cornell University; J.D. 1988, University of Virginia. I thank Professor Joan Flynn for taking
the time to read and make very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am
grateful to Rebecca Buhner, Joan Epstein, and Courtney Swears for their excellent research
assistance, and thank the University of Baltimore School of Law for providing financial
support.
1. For examples of consideration of this questions by scholars, see, for example,
WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM (1994); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING TIlE
WORKPLACE: THE FuTuRE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw (1990); Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology: Implications for Labor
and Employment Law, 76 IND. LJ. 1 (2001); William B. Gould IV, The Third Way: Labor
Policy Beyond the New Deal, 48 KAN. L. REv. 751 (2000); Michael C. Harper, The
Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the Contemporary Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REv.
2322,2326 (1998); William C. Green, Negotiating the Future: The NLRA Paradigm and the
Prospects for Labor Law Reform, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 417 (1994); Symposium on Labor
Law Reform, 69 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 3-290 (1993); Michael Bologna, "NLRA Relevant in
Modem Workplace, Speakers Tell Industrial Relations Meeting," 1998 Daily Lab. Report
(BNA) 07 (January 12, 1998).
For examples of discussions of this issue by labor lawyers, see, for example, Susan
J. McGolrick, NLRB: Board Members, Labor Attorneys Discuss Current State, Future of
NLRB at Symposium, 87 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-1 (May 4,2001); Michael Bologna, NLRB
Still Has Not Addressed New Cyberspace-Based Workplace, 53 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-l
(March 19, 2001); Terry Carter, "A Labor of Law," 86 A.B.AJ. 54 (April 2000); Susan J.
McGolrick, Electronic Communication Raises Issues Over Rights of Workers, Unions,
Employers, 27 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-1 (February 9, 2000); Competition Propelling New
Order in Workplace, Conference Speakers Say, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 97 (May 19,
1995).
For examples of discussions of the issue by NLRB officials, see, for example, Susan J.
McGolrick, NLRB: Four Current Members Discuss Their Views on Major Rulings, Criticism,
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to the relevance of the Board that so far has been mostly ignored-that
the Board is in danger of being rendered a superfluous legal institution
in the scheme of American administrative law. In 1998, the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v.
NLRB2 created an opening for appellate courts to completely disregard
the Board's rulings in labor law cases and decide these cases as they
wish. And a number of appellate courts have already plunged through
that opening to regularly decide labor law cases, and labor law issues,
without any regard for the Board's views on them.
The threat to the Board has come through courts' questioning of the
Board's approach to fact-finding. In Allentown Mack, the Supreme Court
declared that "[the Board] should not be able to impede judicial review, and
indeed political oversight, by disguising its policymaking as fact-finding."3
The Board technique of "disguising" policymaking as fact-finding had been
identified by many scholars, most notably Professor Joan Flynn, who
showed that the Board commonly engaged in the practice of making policy
determinations in the guise of (ostensibly policy-neutral) fact-finding,4 a
practice that Professor Flynn and others dubbed "hiding the ball."5 These
scholars argued that the Board hides the ball in order to make its policy

Future Issues, 154 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-l (Aug. 10, 2001); Drew Douglas, Liebman
Says Reducing Delays, Maintaining Workplace Relevance are NLRB's Challenges, 58 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-1 (March 24, 2000); Susan J. McGolrick, NLRB: Fox, Hurtgen Discuss
Board Turnover, Backlog, Changes in Modem Workplace, 100 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-l

(May 25,1999).
2. 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
3. Id. at 376.
4. Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking and
the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REv. 387 (1995); see also Colin S. Diver,
Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REV. 393, 402 (1981)
(contending that "[t]he 'stairstep' judicial scrutiny announced in cases like NLRB v. Hearstin which questions of 'fact' and 'mixed law and fact' were reviewed leniently, while questions
of 'law' were far more searchingly examined-also encouraged agencies to take a narrow
focus"); Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37
ADMIN L. REv. 163 , 174 (1985) (referring to "fact-specific, subterranean policymaking" by
Board).
5. See Flynn, supra note 4. Professor Flynn credits Harvard Law School Professor
David L. Shapiro as the first to use the term "hiding the ball" to refer to modes of agency
decision-making. See id. at 390 (citing David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking and
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921, 940
(1965».
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determinations less visible and therefore less likely to be reversed by the
federal courts of appeals or attacked by members of Congress. 6
Attacks from Congress are far less frequent than reversals by court of
appeals: Congressional amendment of the National Labor Relations Act has
occurred only a handful of times since its original enactment, with the latest
revision occurring more than 20 years ago. 7 By contrast, appellate courts
reverse dozens of Board decisions every year. 8 Consequently, the more
salient reason for the Board's hiding the ball is to avoid reversal by courts of
appeals, and so the relationship between the Board and those courts will be
the focus of this article.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Allentown Mack now makes it impossible
for the Board to protect its policy judgments through hiding the ball. That
alone requires a significant adjustment in Board decision-making, because as
Professor Flynn has shown, the Board commonly disguises policymaking as
fact-finding in its rulings on a variety of important issues.9 Allentown
Mack's potential impact on the Board, however, extends far beyond the
eradication of Board ball hiding. In Allentown Mack, the Supreme Court
held that "[w]hen the Board purports to be engaged in simple factfinding ... [it] must draw all the inferences the evidence fairly demands."l0
As Part IT explains fully, this holding enables a court to overrule any Board
"inference" on the ground that the court believes it is not the one
"demanded" by the evidence. Thus, courts can overturn any Board
"inferences" with which they disagree.
This is a major threat to the Board because it rarely explicates whether
its rulings are inferences based on fact, or legal judgments based on policy
considerations. Indeed, in a great majority of its decisions, the Board fails to
mention policy at all. Without any clear declaration from the Board that its
6. See Aynn supra note 4; see also Christopher Berzins, Policy Development By
Labour Relations Boards in Canada: Is There a Case for Rulemaking?, 25 QUEENS LJ. 479,
489 & n.36 (2000); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 873, 935 & n.230.
7. See PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 35-86 (1992) (discussing the
four times Congress has amended the Act).
8. See James 1. Brudney et aI., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the
Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 Dmo ST. LJ. 1675, 1694-95 (1999)
(discussing appellate courts' reversal of280 Board decisions in a seven-year period).
9. See infra Part II.C. (discussing Professor Joan Aynri's documentation of issues
where the Board commonly hides the ball in its decisions).
10. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 378 (1998) More
specifically, according to the Court, the Board's inferences must be supported by "substnatial
evidence." See id. at 361,366-377.
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decision is a policy judgment, reviewing courts are free to regard Board
rulings as inferences, which under the Allentown Mack standard must be
supported by "substantial evidence." When the Board's inferences are based
on unstated policy considerations, which is often the case, then almost by
definition they are not based on the factual evidence, and so are readily
subject to reversal under the Allentown Mack standard. The appellate courts
have in fact already demonstrated a tendency to treat Board rulings as
inferences, and to reverse them under the rationale of Allentown Mack. 11
With the bulk of its decisions being open to practically unrestricted review
by the courts, the Board faces the prospect of having no meaningful role in
American labor law.
The key for the Board to preserve its relevance is for it to reclaim a very
important role indeed: that of the primary policymaker in labor relations. As
discussed in Part ill, that is the role that Congress intended for the Board
when it enacted the National Labor Relations Act. In particular, Congress
deliberately chose the Board to predominate over the courts in making labor
policy. Part ill also explains that judicial deference to the Board is required
by current standards of administrative law, and supported by practical
advantages the Board possesses over the courts in making labor policy.
Part IV addresses another emerging threat to the Board, a theory that
courts are not required to defer even to Board policymaking. After Part IV
establishes that the Board is indeed entitled to deference when it makes
policy, Part V urges the Board to reassert consistently and openly that it is
making labor policy through its rulings. Part V makes specific
recommendations on how the Board should go about doing this, discussmg
typical approaches the Board now uses in making its decisions and
explaining how to reform those approaches to emphasize the Board's
policymaking role. As Part V describes, the Board can combine the
reassertion of its policymaking role with its ongoing project of considering
how labor law should respond to societal changes. In this way, the Board
would not only remain relevant, but would take the leading role in shaping
labor law for the 21st century.

11. See infra Part 11.0. (discussing circuit court decisions relying on Allentown Mack to
reverse Board decisions).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT!NV ALIDATES HIDING THE BALL

A. Curtin Matheson
The groundwork for the majority opinion in Allentown Mack was laid by
the author of that opinion, Justice Scalia, in his dissent eight years earlier in
NLRB v. Curtin Matheson. 12 The views on NLRB decision-making that
Justice Scalia unsuccessfully promoted in Curtin Matheson were adopted by
a majority of the Court in Allentown Mack. Some of the strictures that
Justice Scalia imposed on the NLRB in Allentown Mack were more fully
explained in his dissent in Curtin Matheson. Consequently, in order to fully
understand the limits and requirements the Supreme Court has now placed
on NLRB decision-making, it is important to analyze Curtin Matheson as
well as Allentown Mack.
The issue in Curtin Matheson, as in Allentown Mack, was whether the
employer had been legally justified in withdrawing recognition from a
union, based on alleged "good faith reasonable doubt" that the union was
supported by a majority of employees. 13 Curtin Matheson contended that the
fact that it had hired permanent replacements, and that those replacements
outnumbered the strikers at the time of withdrawal of recognition, was a
legally sufficient ground for doubting the union's majority status and
withdrawing recognition. 14
Justice Scalia asserted that the question presented in the case was
whether the Board's "factual finding" that Curtin Matheson' lacked
reasonable doubt of the union's majority status was supported by
"substantial evidence."15 The Court majority rejected that definition of the
question presented, saying that it "misconstrue[d] the issue."16 The Court
majority pointed out that in the petition for certiorari the question presented
had been phrased as "whether, in assessing the reasonableness of an
employer's asserted doubt that an incumbent union enjoys continued
majority support, the Board may refuse to apply any presumption regarding
the extent of union support among replacements for striking employees."17
The Court then explained that the question whether to apply this
12. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990).
at 777-78.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

at 801 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
at 778 n.2.
(quoting Nat'l Labor Relations Board's Petition for Certiorari at I, NLRB v.
Curtin Matheson Scientific Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990) (No. 88-1685».
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presumption arose in "all cases of this type," and was not an "evidentiary
question" limited to "the facts of this particular case." Therefore, the Court
held, the "substantial evidence standard" for reviewing Board fact-finding
was "inapplicable to the issue before us."18 Having defined the issue in
terms of whether the Board should adopt a general presumption, the Court
majority devoted the rest of its decision to discussing whether the Board's
refusal to adopt the presumption was rational and legally permissible, which
the Court found it was. 19
Justice Scalia's dissent, in which Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
joined, began by stating, ''The Court makes heavy weather out of what is,
under well-established principles of administrative law, a straightforward
case."20 As noted earlier, Justice Scalia regarded the case as involving a
"straightforward" matter of fact-fmding. Justice Scalia declared that the
issue whether the employer had a reasonable doubt of the union's majority
status was a "central factual determination," and that, therefore, the question
before the Court was whether the Board's factual determination in this case
was supported by "substantial evidence."21
After summarizing the facts and procedural background of the case in
Part I of his dissent, Justice Scalia began Part II by explaining the bases for
applying the "substantial evidence" standard to the Board's decision. Justice
Scalia asserted that application of the "substantial evidence" standard was
required both by § lO(f) of the National Labor Relations Act and by
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section lO(f) of the
NLRA is the provision governing judicial review of Board decisions, and it
directs courts to apply the "substantial evidence" standard to Board findings
oJJact. 22 With regard to the APA, Justice Scalia stated that an NLRB unfair
labor practice case is a "formal adjudication" as defined in § 554 of the
APA.23 Justice Scalia then explained that for formal adjudications, the APA
requires that "the agency opinion must contain 'fmdings and conclusions,
and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or
discretion presented on the record "'24 and that a court reviewing an agency
18. ld. at 778 n.2.
19. See id. at 778 n.2, 787-796.
20. ld. at 801 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. ld.
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 16O(f) (1994)

("[T]he findings of the Board with respect to
questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole
shall in like manner be conclusive.").
23. 494 U.S. at 803 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994».
24. ld. at 804 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1994».
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adjudication "must 'hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be ... unsupported by substantial evidence. "'25
As these quotations demonstrate, § 1O(f) of the NLRA expressly applies
only to Board findings of fact, and § 706 of the APA also seems to be more
pertinent to factual findings than legal conclusions, as it refers to "findings
and conclusions . . . unsupported by evidence" rather than conclusions
unsupported by reasoning or precedent. Consequently, Justice Scalia's
conclusion that the "substantial evidence" standard applied to the Board's
decision was based largely on his premise that the decision was a fmding of
fact.
As noted above, the Court majority disagreed with this premise and with
the appropriateness of the substantial evidence standard. Justice Scalia
challenged the majority's holding that the question presented was whether
the Board must adopt a "general presumption" that striker replacements
oppose the union. 26 Justice Scalia argued that the majority's approach
amounted to "characterizing factual probabilities as presumptions."27 Justice
Scalia illustrated this assertion by describing a hypothetical appeal of a
criminal conviction, in which the basis for the appeal was the defendant's
assertion that the record showed that he was not at the scene of the crime.
Justice Scalia argued that the majority's characterization of the issue in
Curtin Matheson as the validity of a presumption was ''the equivalent of
characterizing the [hypothetical] appeal ... as involving, not the adequacy
of the evidence, but rather the question whether the jury was required to
adopt the general presumption that a person cannot be in two places at the
.
same time. "28
Justice Scalia then contended that it was "misleading" to label as a
"presumption" the fact that striker replacements likely oppose the union,
because that fact should instead have been treated as probative evidence. 29
According to Justice Scalia, the Board's "refusal" to take that evidence into
account "den[ied] evidence its inherently probative effect" and thus
"produce[d] a decision that is not supported by substantial evidence."30
Justice Scalia charged that the Board, in framing both the question presented
to the Court and the central issue in its own decision as the validity of
25. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2}(E) (1994}).
26. See id. at 778 n.2 (majority's definition of question presented); id. at 812 (Justice

Scalia's reference to this definition).
27. Id. at 812 (Scalia, 1., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 813.

30. Id.
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rejecting a presumption, was "invit[ing] us to confuse fact-finding with
policymaking."31 And Justice Scalia chastised the Court majority for
"accept[ing] the invitation."32
The Court majority did in fact adopt the Board's position that policy
considerations, particularly promotion of bargaining stability, also supported
the Board's refusal to "presume" that striker replacements oppose the
union.3 3 Indeed, the majority criticized Justice Scalia for "entirely ignor[ing]
the Board's policy considerations, apparently on the rationale that policy is
an illegitimate factor in the Board's decision."34 The Court majority noted,
quite correctly, that Justice Scalia's treatment of policy issues was "founded
on the premise that the issue before us is the factual question whether
substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that respondent lacked a
good-faith doubt."35
Justice Scalia's response to the charge he had "ignored" policy was, in
essence, that the Board claimed to be engaging in fact-finding, and that it
was inappropriate for the Board to promote policymaking through factfinding. Justice Scalia devoted much of his dissent to drawing a firm
distinction between fact-finding and law- or policymaking. This distinction
that Justice Scalia advocated in Curtin Matheson was later adopted by a
Court majority in Allentown Mack, so this portion of Scalia's Curtin
Matheson dissent is crucial in understanding how Allentown Mack affects
Board decision-making.
Justice Scalia explained that the use of the single term "presumption"
obscured the point that there were distinct "presumptions of law" and
"presumptions of fact," with the latter also known as "inferences."36 As an
example of the former, a presumption "applied 'as a matter of law,''' Scalia
gave the Board's holding in Pennco,37 in which the Board said it would
presume that striker replacements supported the union.3 8 Justice Scalia
maintained that this sort of legal or policy judgment was distinct from a
factual presumption or inference, "which is '[a] process of reasoning by
which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a logical
31. Id.

32. Id.

33. Id. at 794-95.
34. Id. at 795 n.13.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

37. Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716 (1980), enforced,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 994 (1982).
38. 494 U.S. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

684 F.2d 340 (6th

CiT.

1982),
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consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or
admitted.' "39
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Board has discretion in employing
presumptions of law, that it could "create and apply" them "as means of
implementing authorized law or policy in the course of adjudication."40
Justice Scalia even granted that the Board could adopt legal presumptions
that were contrary to factual reality ("in the teeth of the facts," as he put it),
giving as an example the Board's policy of almost invariably presuming
majority support for a union during the ftrst year following its
certiftcation.41 But Justice Scalia contended that the Board did not have
discretion over inferences or presumptions of fact. Justice Scalia declared
that inferences "are not creatures of the Board but its masters, representing
the dictates of reason and logic that must be applied in making adjudicatory
factual determinations. "42
Justice Scalia then applied this distinction between presumptions of law
and presumptions of fact to the Board's decision in Curtin Matheson. Justice
Scalia stated that the Board "perhaps ... could lawfully have reached the
outcome it did here" through a presumption of law-speciftcally, by
''forbidding'' on policy grounds the "rational inference" that "an employer
has good-faith doubt of majority status when more than half the bargaining
unit are strike replacements."43 But, Justice Scalia found, the Board did not
employ a presumption of law in its decision. Instead, the Board purported to
engage in basic fact-ftnding and to ftnd "as a matter of logic and reasoning,
'the hiring of permanent replacements who cross a picket line, in itself, does
not support an inference that the replacements repudiate the union as
collective-bargaining representative. "'44 Justice Scalia declared that this
factual ftnding was "simply false."45 According to Justice Scalia, the Board,
in failing to draw the inferences that were dictated by "reason and 10gic,"46
was guilty of "bad fact-ftnding, and must be reversed under the 'substantial
evidence' test."47

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

at 816 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 816 (quoting Station KKHI,
at 815.
at 816 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1344 (1987».
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Justice Scalia explained that for the Board "to support its decision
properly on policy grounds" the Board should have stated its conclusion in
terms of a "counterfactual presumption" of law, i.e., "[e]ven though the facts
require conclusion X, we reject it for policy reasons."48 Instead, the Board
had claimed to find that the facts (that a majority of employees were striker
replacements) did not support the conclusion that the employer had a
reasonable doubt of the union's majority status. Near the conclusion of his
dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that when the Board professes to be doing
fact-finding, then the only pertinent question is whether the evidence
supports the Board's findings. 49 In other words, the Board cannot rely on
legal or policy considerations to support its findings of fact.
Thus, in Curtin Matheson, Justice Scalia announced his position that
fact-finding was distinct from policymaking, and that the Board could not
use the former to carry out the latter. Foreshadowing the holding in
Allentown Mack, Justice Scalia declared that the Board "is not entitled to
disguise policymaking as fact-finding, and thereby to escape the legal and
political limitations to which policymaking is subject."50
B. Allentown Mack

In 1998, eight years after Curtin Matheson, Justice Scalia revisited the
issue of Board decision-making in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v.
NLRB.51 Although the Court split three ways in Allentown Mack, four
Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Thomas) joined Parts ill and N of Justice Scalia's opinion, in which he set
forth his holdings on Board fact-finding and decision-making. Thus, Justice
Scalia spoke for a majority of the Court on these issues, and his opinion in
Allentown Mack establishes the current governing law on Board decisionmaking.
Like Curtin Matheson, Allentown Mack involved an employer that had
withdrawn recognition from an incumbent union. The Board had decided
48. ld. at 817.
49. [d. at 819 (Scalia, 1., dissenting) ("Thus, when the Board purports to find no goodfaith doubt because the facts do not establish it, the question for review is whether there is
substantial evidence to support that determination."). With regard to this dissent
"foreshadowing" the Supreme Court's decision in Allentown Mack, see Joan flynn,
Allentown Mack: A Happy Exemplar of the Law of Unintended Consequences?, 49 LAB. L. 1.
983, 990 (1998) ("[T]o read Scalia's Curtin Matheson dissent is to see the foundation for
Allentown Mack being laid.").
50. [d. (Scalia, 1., dissenting).
51. 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
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that the company had committed unfair labor practices when it conducted a
poll of its employees to determine their level of support for the incumbent
union and also when it withdrew recognition of that union when the poll
revealed that less than a majority of employees supported the union. 52 In
finding these violations, the Board applied its rule that withdrawal of
recognition from an incumbent union, or even employer polling to assess
employee support for such a union, are permissible only when the employer
has a "good faith reasonable doubt," based on "objective considerations,"
that the union is supported by a majority of employees. The Board found
that Allentown Mack failed to show that it had such objective reasonable
doubt at the time of its polling, and therefore its polling and its consequent
withdrawal of recognition were unlawful. 53 The Board's decision was
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 54
In Allentown Mack's appeal to the Supreme Court, it challenged the
Board's decision on essentially three grounds. The first ground was that it
was irrational for the Board to require that an employer already have an
"objective reasonable doubt" of a union's majority status before the
employer can poll its employees to determine their support for the union. 55
The Court rejected that argument, finding that the Board's standard was
"puzzling,"56 but not irrational. 57 Allentown Mack's second and third
grounds, which the Court called "conceptually intertwined,"58 were that the
Board erred in its factual finding that Allentown Mack had lacked a
reasonable doubt of the union's majority status, and that in reaching this
finding the Board followed a pattern of cases in which the agency professed
to apply the "reasonable doubt" standard but actually required the employer
to show that the union had definitely lost majority support. 59 Justice Scalia
and a majority of the Court ultimately agreed with both these arguments.
In Part ill of the Court's majority opinion, Justice Scalia defined the
question presented as whether the Board had erred in finding the employer
had "no reasonable doubt" of the union's majority status. Justice Scalia then
52. See Allentown Mack, 316 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1995); see also Allentown Mack Sales &
Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1998) (summarizing the Board's ruling).
53. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 362-63.
54. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
55. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 363.
56. [d. at 364.
57. [d. at 364-66.
58. [d. at 364.
59. [d.
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turned to defining what "reasonable doubt" meant. Justice Scalia focused on
the meaning of the word "doubt." The Board argued that it regarded the
word "doubt" as meaning "disbelief," but Justice Scalia rejected this
definition as "linguistic revisionism. "60 Justice Scalia held that "doubt"
meant "uncertainty," and that therefore the issue before the Court was
whether a fact-finder could reasonably decide, based on the record, that
Allentown Mack lacked reasonable uncertainty about whether the union was
supported by a majority of employees. 61 Justice Scalia then reviewed the
evidence and foUnd that the Board had rejected much evidence that showed
that Allentown Mack had reasons for being "uncertain" of the union's
support, because the Board incorrectly demanded that evidence be firm
proof that the union had actually lost support. 62 Taking into account the
evidence rejected by the Board, Justice Scalia concluded at the end of Part
ill of his opinion that it was "quite impossible for a rational fact-finder to
avoid the conclusion that Allentown had reasonable, good-faith grounds to
doubt-to be uncertain about-the union's retention of majority support."63
That conclusion could have been a sufficient basis for overturning the
Board's decision-indeed, Justice Scalia noted "[t]hat conclusion would
make this a fairly straightforward administrative-law case."64 But Justice
Scalia and the majority did not stop there. Instead, Justice Scalia, now with
the support of four of his colleagues, returned to the criticisms of Board
decision-making that he had begun in his Curtin Matheson dissent.
Justice Scalia raised these issues at the beginning of Part IV of his
opinion by noting that the employer argued in its brief that although ''the
Board continues to cite the words of the good faith doubt branch of its
withdrawal of recognition standard ... it has in practice eliminated the good
faith doubt branch in favor of a strict head count."65 Justice Scalia then
observed that though the Board "not too persuasively" denied that it required
an actual head count, the Board did "defend its fact-finding in this case by
saying that it has regularly rejected similarly persuasive demonstrations of
reasonable good-faith doubt in prior decisions."66 Justice Scalia also pointed
out that the D.C. Circuit had "accepted this defense," as the court relied on
"earlier, similar decisions to conclude that the Board's findings were
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 367.

at 368-71.
at 371.
at 372.
65. [d. (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 10, Allentown Mack,
66. [d.

522 U.S. 359 (1998».
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supported by substantial evidence here."67 Justice Scalia closed the first
paragraph of Part IV by relying on Professor Flynn's article on Board ball
hiding, describing her article as "academic commentary" that suggested that
the Board's ruling in Allentown Mack "conforrn[edJ to a long pattern,"68 and
quoting the article at length for the proposition that the Board's actual
standard deviated from its stated one. 69
Justice Scalia found that the Board's defense of consistency with prior
decisions, and the D.C. Circuit's acceptance of that defense, placed before
the Supreme Court the question whether it was permissible for the Board to
employ in a case a standard as "consistently applied" rather than the
standard "[as] recited."70 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Board "could
certainly have . . . impos[ed] a more stringent requirement than the
reasonable-doubt test, or ... adopt[ed] a formal requirement that employers
establish their reasonable doubt by more than a preponderance of the
evidence.'>71 But the Board did not choose that approach. The Board's
approach, in Justice Scalia's characterization, was "formally leaving in place
the reasonable-doubt and preponderance standards, but consistently applying
them as though they meant something other than what they say."72 Justice
Scalia devoted the remainder of his opinion to explaining why the Board's
approach was legally impermissible.
As in his Curtin Matheson dissent, Justice Scalia relied on the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as a basis for invalidating the Board's
decision-making approach. Justice Scalia explained that the APA
"establishes a scheme of 'reasoned decision-making, "'73 which means that
"[n]ot only must an agency's decreed result be within the scope of its lawful
authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and
rational."74 Justice Scalia pointed out that NLRB adjudication is governed
by the APA's requirement of reasoned decision-making. And Justice Scalia
reasoned that the requirement of reasoned decision-making dictated that the
standard announced must be the same as the standard actually applied:
67. [d. at 372 (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 1483, 1488
(D.C. Cir. 1996)).
68. [d. at 372.
69. See id. at 372-73 (quoting Aynn, supra note 4, at 394-95).
70. [d. at 373.
71. [d. at 373-74.
72. [d. at 374.
73. [d. at 374 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)).
74. [d. at 374.
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It is hard to imagine a more violent breach of that requirement [of reasoned
decision-making] than applying a rule of primary conduct or a standard of
proof which is in fact different from the rule or standard formally announced.
And the consistent repetition of that breach can hardly mend it. 75

After holding that the Board's practice of departing from announced
standards violated the APA, Justice Scalia also condemned the practice for
causing major practical problems. Justice Scalia found that the Board's
practice would prevent "consistent application of the law by subordinate
personnel (notably administrative law judges)"76 because such personnel
would be unable to determine which standard to follow. 77 Justice Scalia then
raised what seemed to him an even greater concern-that the Board's
conduct "prevented" and "frustrated" effective judicial review. 78
Justice Scalia not only expressed concern that the Board's departure
from announced standards would impair judicial review, he strongly implied
that such impairment was the intentional goal of the Board in deciding cases
in this manner. Justice Scalia referred to the Board's practice of
"divorcing ... the rule announced from the rule applied" as a "revision of
the Board's standard of proof' that was "achieved . . . subtly and
obliquely ..."79 Justice Scalia explained that the Board's "revising
standards" in this way would make it difficult for appellate courts and even
the Supreme Court to review Board decisions. 80 Justice Scalia then tied this
particular practice to the larger concerns about Board fact-finding that he .
had expressed in Curtin Matheson. Justice Scalia repeated his admonition
from Curtin Matheson that the Board should not be allowed to "disguis[e] its
policymaking as fact-finding," but this time charged that the Board used that
mode of decision-making to "impede judicial review, and indeed even
political oversight. "81
75. Id.
76. Id. at 375.
77. See id. at 375-76 (using Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1992), as
an example of the Board sending unclear and confusing directions to administrative law
judges ("AUs"».
78. Id. at 375-76.
79. Id. at 376.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 376. In Professor flynn's article, she also concluded that the Board's reason
for disguising policymaking as fact-finding was to protect its policies from judicial review.
See flynn, supra note 4, at 421-45. Although Justice Scalia reached the same conclusion in
Part IV of his opinion, and Justice Scalia extensively quoted Professor flynn's article in the
same Part, Justice Scalia did not explicitly rely on Professor flynn's article to support his
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In Curtin Matheson, Justice Scalia had contended that it was improper
for the Board to conduct policymaking through fact-finding. In Allentown
Mack, speaking for the majority, Justice Scalia imposed this as a limitation
on Board decision-making. And this time, he asserted that the limitation was
necessary to enable meaningful judicial review. Justice Scalia declared that
the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts "do not, moreover (we could
not possibly), search to find revisions ofthe agency's rules-revisions of the
requisite fact that the adjudication is supposed to determine-hidden in the
agency's factual findings."82 Rather than have courts search for the policies
the Board "hid" amongst its findings of fact, Justice Scalia decreed that the
Board could not engage in policymaking in the course of fact-fmding.
Justice Scalia held that this limit on Board decision-making was required
by the substantial evidence standard of review. Again repeating a position he
had staked out in his Curtin Matheson dissent, Justice Scalia held that
because the Board purported to be engaging in "[o]n-the-record agency factfinding" its decision was subject to the "substantial evidence" standard, both
under § lO(e) of the NLRA and § 706(2)(E) of the APA.83 Justice Scalia
stressed that this was "an objective test," in which the court determined
whether there was sufficient evidence for a "reasonable fact-finder" to reach
the conclusion in question. 84 Justice Scalia then reasoned that it would be
practically impossible for courts to apply the substantial evidence test if the
Board made policy through fact-finding, because whenever a court
suggested that a Board factual finding was erroneous, the Board could claim
that the finding was correctly based on a revised legal standard. As Justice
Scalia put it, allowing the Board to make policy through fact-fmding would
result in "a regime in which inadequate factual findings become simply a
revision of the standard that the Board's (adjudicatorily adopted) rules set
forth, thereby converting those findings into rule-interpretations to which
judges must defer."85 Justice Scalia concluded that in such a regime, "the
'substantial evidence' factual review provision of the APA becomes a
view that the Board was concealing policymaking to impede judicial review. Instead, as noted
elsewhere, Justice Scalia expressly referred to Professor Flynn's article as showing that the
Board had a "long pattern" of actually departing from the stated "good faith doubt" standard
when deciding withdrawal of recognition cases. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying
text; infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text (describing Justice Scalia's discussion of
Professor Flynn's article).
82. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 377.
83. [d. at 377 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2002) and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2002».
84. ld.
85. ld. at 377-78.
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nullity."86 Therefore, to preserve the substantial evidence standard, the
Board must be forbidden from engaging in policymaking through factfinding.
Justice Scalia next revisited the distinction between fact-finding and
policymaking that he had described in detail in Curtin Matheson. As in that
case, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Board had considerable discretion
in making policy: ''The Board can, of course, forthrightly and explicitly
adopt counterfactual evidentiary presumptions (which are in effect
substantive rules of law) as a way of furthering legal or policy goals-for
example, the Board's irrebuttable presumption of majority support for the
union during the year following certification."87 Similarly, Justice Scalia
also granted that "[t]he Board might also be justified in forthrightly and
explicitly adopting a rule of evidence that categorically excludes certain
testimony on policy grounds, without reference to its inherent probative
value."88 Justice Scalia indicated that the only limits on the Board's
authority to make policy decisions were that such decisions were "subject to
judicial review for their reasonableness and their compatibility with the
Act."89
By contrast, Justice Scalia and the majority held that the Board had little
or no discretion when conducting fact-finding. Justice Scalia held, "[w]hen
the Board purports to be engaged in simple fact-finding, unconstrained by
substantive presumptions or evidentiary rules of exclusion, it is not free to
prescribe what inferences from the evidence it will accept and reject, but
must draw all inferences that the evidence fairly demands."90 Justice Scalia
left no doubt that the Board was mandated to draw all inferences suggested
by the facts-not only did he state that the Board "must" do so, but he also
stated that drawing such inferences was the Board's "obligation."91
Justice Scalia further declared that this "obligation" to draw the
inferences "demanded" by the facts was "the foundation of all honest and
legitimate adjudication."92 This echoed Justice Scalia's proclamation in
Curtin Matheson that factual inferences were "masters" of the Board and
represented "the dictates of reason and logic that must be applied in making

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

[d. at 378.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. (emphasis added).
[d.
[d. at 379.
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adjudicatory factual detenninations."93 Thus, Justice Scalia and the majority
made clear that the Board had to follow a straight and narrow path in
drawing inferences from the facts, without taking into account policy or any
other considerations. In Curtin Matheson, Justice Scalia had asserted that the
Board could not "disguise policymaking as fact-finding."94 In Allentown
Mack, Justice Scalia and the majority held that the Board was forbidden to
inject policy considerations into fact-finding at all.
C. Allentown Mack's Challenge to the Board
Allentown Mack's rule that the Board must conduct its fact-finding
without being influenced by policy considerations presents a major threat to
well-established practices of the Board in adjudication. As noted in the
Introduction, Professor Joan Flynn has thoroughly documented that· the
Board frequently implements its policy judgments through fact-finding, that
in fact the Board often disguises its policymaking as fact-finding. 95 When
deciding Allentown Mack, the Supreme Court was almost certainly aware of
how commonly the Board engaged in this practice. Indeed, as will be
discussed shortly, the Court majority was specifically aware of Professor
Flynn's article on the subject, and relied on it in defining the kind of Board
fact-finding that was invalid.
In her article, Professor Flynn explained that the most common method
through which the Board concealed its policymaking within its fact-finding
is something she named the "de jure/de facto gap."96 When the Board uses
the de jure/de facto gap, there is a "significant disparity between the Board's
articulated adjudicative standard and its application of that standard."97
Professor Flynn explained that the Board typically employs this method
through a legal standard that "sounds flexible" on its face, "but that the
Board applies in a rigid, near-absolute fashion."98
Professor Flynn then discussed -a number of situations in which the
Board consistently purported to apply a flexible, multi-factor standard (such
as the "totality of circumstances" test) while actually applying a per se rule

93. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S.
dissenting).
94. [d. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Flynn, supra note 4.
96. See id. at 393-94 (explaining the de jure/de facto gap).
97. [d. at 393.
.
98. [d. at 394.

775, 815 (1990)

(Scalia, J.,
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or limiting its focus to only one or two factors. 99 The first situation
discussed by Professor Flynn was the one later at issue in Allentown Mack:
the Board's standard for employer withdrawals of recognition. As noted
above, the Supreme Court majority relied extensively on this portion of
Professor Flynn's article. The Court referred to the article as "academic
commentary" that showed that the Board had a "long pattern" of engaging in
fact-finding that was at odds with the stated legal standard. 100 The Supreme
Court then quoted Professor Flynn at length to describe the Board's factfinding method. The Court stated that "[o]ne scholar, after conducting "[a]
thorough review of the withdrawal of recognition case law," concluded:
"[C]ircumstantial evidence, no matter how abundant, is rarely, if ever,
enough to satisfy the good-faith doubt test. In practice, the Board deems the
test satisfied only if the employer has proven that a majority of the bargaining
unit has expressly repudiated the union. Such direct evidence, however, is
nearly impossible to gather lawfully. Thus, the Board's good-faith doubt
standard, although ostensibly a highly fact-dependent totality-of-thecircumstances test, approaches a per se rule in application ....,,101

In her article, Professor Flynn concluded that the Board varied its factfinding from its announced standard in order to further policy objectives.
Professor Flynn stated that "the Board's ultra-stringent application of the
good-faith doubt test is plainly meant to further the increasingly elevated
statutory goal of stability in bargaining relationships."102 Professor Flynn
observed that "the Board could pursue this goal more directly by simply
banning withdrawals of recognition,"103 but quickly added that the Board's
"apparent reluctance to take such a direct route is readily explained;
withdrawals have been permitted throughout the Act's entire 60-year history,
and an outright ban on them would certainly draw close judicial
scrutiny."104 The Allentown Mack Court did not explicitly cite this part of
Professor Flynn's article. But as discussed in the previous section, the Court
majority, either in implicit reliance on Professor Flynn or on its own,
discussed the same motives for the Board's approach-making policy and
99. [d. at 394-99.
100. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 372 (1998).
101. [d. at 372-73 (quoting Flynn, supra note 4, at 394-95) (citations in Flynn article
omitted).
102. Flynn, supra note 4, at 399.
103. [d.
104. [d. at 399-400.
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evading judicial scrutiny of that policy. 105 The Court addressed both
rationales, holding that the Board could not make policy through factfinding,106 and could not "impede judicial review . . . by disguising its
policymaking as fact-finding."107
Withdrawal of recognition is not the only situation in which the Board
applies a de jure/de facto gap, and Professor Flynn discussed two other
examples in her article. The first was the Board's application of the nowdefunct Jean CountryI08 standard, which was used to determine whether
union organizers had a right of access to an employer's property. The Jean
Country standard was a multi-factor balancing test that on its face seemed
fact-specific. I09 But the Board, when applying the Jean Country test, almost
invariably held that organizers had to be granted access to the employer's
property. 110 The second example discussed by Professor Flynn was the very
important issue of bargaining unit determinations, III which the Board must
make in hundreds of representation cases every year. The Board applies the
vague "community of interest" standard to this issue and claims that the unit
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis that takes into account a
"long list of factors."112 In actuality, however, "the flexibility of the Board's
approach is illusory," 113 and the Board typically applies fixed presumptions
and per se rules to define units. 114

105. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of
Allentown Mack).
107. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998); see
also supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing this portion of Allentown Mack).
108. 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988). The Supreme Court struck down the Jean Country test
in 1992 in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
109. As Professor Aynn put it, the Jean Country standard "appeared to involve an
extremely open-ended inquiry, the outcome of which would be difficult to predict in any
given case." Aynn, supra note 4, at 396.
110. Id. at 397 & nn. 42-43 (citing, inter alia, Peter J. Ford, The NLRB, Jean Country,
and Access to Private Property: A Reasonable Alternative Means of Communication under
Fairmont Hotel, 13 Geo. Mas. U.L. Rev. 683, 700 (1991); Robert A. Gorman, Union Access
to Private Property: A Critical Assessment of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.I. 1,

7 (1991».
111. See id. at 397-99 (discussing Board's approach to bargaining unit
determinations).
112. Id. at 397.
113. Id. at 398.
114. [d. (citing Berton B. Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board: The Case
for Making Rules on Collective Bargaining Units, 32 LAB. L.I. 105, 110 (1981».
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Professor Flynn explained that as was the case with withdrawal of
recognition, the Board's de jure/de facto gaps in its treatment of the issues of
access to property and bargaining units resulted from the Board's desire to
further policy goals in a surreptitious manner. 115 Professor Flynn reasoned
that the Board favored granting organizers access to property because the
Board attached greater importance to the NLRA-guaranteed rights of
employees to communicate about unionization than to the state-law property
rights of employers. 116 But according to Professor Flynn, the Board did not
announce this pro-access policy openly because the Board suspected, with
good reason, that appellate judges would elevate property rights over NLRA
rights. 1l7 Similarly, the Board's presumptions and de facto rules on
bargaining units all tend to make units easier to organize, but open "proorganizing" policies have faced hostility from Congress I 18 and probably
would from appellate judges as well. I 19
Although the de jure/de facto gap is the primary means through which
the Board hides its policymaking within fact-finding, Professor Flynn found
that the Board sometimes used another method, which she called
"manipulation of legislative fact-finding."120 Professor Flynn explained that
"legislative facts" are "facts or assumptions about the way the regulated
parties behave in the real world" that often serve as the factual premise for
decision-making. 121 Professor Flynn determined that the Board sometimes
"manipulates its findings regarding industrial reality in order to mask an outand-out policy judgment as the mere product of impartial legislative factfinding."122 In these instances, the Board, rather than admitting it is making
a policy judgment, "will instead assert that the policy necessarily follows
1 15. See id. at 400-04 (discussing the motivations underlying the Board's approach to
the access to property and bargaining unit issues).
116. Id. at 400.
117. Id. at 400-02.
118. See Susan J. McGolrick, Over Chairman's Dissent, Board Withdraws Proposed
Rule on Single Location Bargaining, 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 35 (February 23, 1998)
(explaining that Board withdrew proposed rule because of strong opposition by employers and
Republican members of Congress); Michelle Amber, NLRB Seeks Relief from Congressional
Rider Banning Funds for Single Location Unit Rule, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 26 (Feb. 7,
1997) (discussing Congressional measure blocking Board from issuing a rule on single
location bargaining units).
119. See Flynn, supra note 4, at 397-98 (discussing why judges would resist
bargaining unit policies that facilitate union organizing).
120. See id. at 405 (explaining manipulation of legislative fact-finding).
121. Id. Professor Flynn noted that legislative facts in labor law are typically referred
to as "industrial reality."
122. Id.
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from its findings of fact-findings that have been carefully shaped to
support the desired end."123
As a prime example of the Board's use of legislative fact-finding to
disguise policymaking, Professor Flynn discussed the Board doctrine upheld
by the Supreme Court in Curtin Matheson: 124 that the Board would not
apply any presumption as to whether striker replacements supported or
opposed the union. 125 Professor Flynn pointed out that in the Station
KKHI126 decision, where the Board first adopted this rule, the Board had
"characterized its position as a product of careful legislative fact-finding,
emphasizing that its members had 'carefully ... assessed [their] experience'
before concluding that generalizations about replacements' union sentiments
were simply not possible."127 Professor Flynn explained that the Board's
conclusion was unsupportable as a matter of legislative fact-finding, and that
the Board's ruling was almost certainly grounded in policy considerations
that the Board chose not to reveal. 128
Professor Flynn showed that there were strong reasons why
"[p]ermanent [striker] replacements almost surely oppose the union."129
Replacements usually encounter verbal abuse (and sometimes even physical
abuse) from union members, and more importantly, unions almost always
seek to oust replacements from their jobs to make room for returning
strikers. 130 Professor Flynn explained that though the facts did not support
the Board "no presumption" rule, policy considerations did. If the Board
adopted the factually accurate presumption that replacements oppose the
union, there would be negative policy consequences. Employers would have
a major incentive to provoke strikes because employers would be entitled to
withdraw recognition from a union simply by hiring a sufficient number of
replacements. 131 Moreover, without the union's presence, strikers would

123.

ld.

124.

NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775 (1990); see discussion
supra Part II.A.
125. See Flynn, supra note 4, at 405-06 (discussing the Board's adoption of the "no
presumption" position).
126. 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989).
127. Flynn, supra note 4, at 406 (quoting Station KKHl, 284 N.L.R.B. at 1344).
128. ld. at 406-11. Professor Flynn noted that the Board briefly "acknowledged that
policy considerations contributed" to its decision, but she explained that the Board referred to
these policy factors only as a "make-weight" and the Board devoted most of its discussion to
legislative fact-finding. See id. at 406 n.83.
129. ld. at 406-07.
130. ld. at 407-08.
131. ld. at 408.
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lose almost any prospect of reclaiming their jobs, which would substantially
undermine the statutorily protected right to strike. 132 Professor Flynn
concluded that "[t]he Board's refusal to acknowledge replacements' true
union sentiments is plainly intended to forestall the untoward results
described above."133 Nonetheless, the Board did not openly admit to these
policy bases for its ruling, but instead asserted it was based on (very
questionable) legislative fact-fmding. Professor Flynn reasoned that in
establishing the "no presumption" rule, the Board disguised its policymaking
as legislative fact-finding because'of fears that an explicit policy judgment
would be more vulnerable to attack by the federal circuit courts and by
Congress. 134
Professor Flynn described a number of issues regarding which the Board
consistently disguises its policymaking as fact-finding, and all these issues
are very significant in labor relations. The "community interest" standard for
defining bargaining units is applied to nearly every union representation
election. 135 The standard for withdrawal of recognition plays a decisive role
whenever an employer decides to question whether it must continue to
accept a union as its employees' representative. And though cases involving
permanent replacement of strikers are less common than representation
elections or withdrawal of recognition, few issues are more central to the
NLRA's balance of employer and employee interests than the viability of
employees' right to strike. The Board's decisions on these vitally important
issues are now all subject to reversal by the appellate courts on the ground
that the approach the Board uses to decide them violates Allentown Mack's
stricture against disguising policymaking as fact -finding. 136
In addition, based on Allentown Mack, appellate courts could rewrite,
and repeal, many other doctrines of labor law by relying on empirical studies
that are critical of the Board. For example, a famous study by Professors
Getman, Goldberg and Herman found that empirical data did not support the
factual assumptions that underlay many of the Board's legal rules.137 The
132,
133.
134.
135.
136.
also supra

137.

Id. at 409.
Id.
Id. at 411-12.
See Hardin, supra note 7, at 448-52 (discussing community of interest standard).
See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998); see
Part II.B.(discussing Allentown Mack's holding).

Juuus G. GETMAN, ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAw AND
140-50 (1976) (summarizing findings on validity of Board assumptions). This study
was not only famous, but also controversial: Several scholars wrote articles criticizing the
study's methodology, while Professors Getman, Goldberg and others responded with articles
defending the study. See Cox, Bok, Gorman & Finkin, LABOR LAw 186-91 (13th ed. 2(01);
REAurY

2002]

AFTER "HIDING THE BALL" IS OVER

545

researchers found, for example, that employer promises or grants of benefits
during union organizing campaigns, which the Board has long proscribed as
illegally "interfering" with employees' right to support a union, actually
have little or no impact on employees' support of unions. 138 The researchers
similarly found that employer questioning of employees about their views on
unions, which the Board regards as coercive and illegal "interrogation," did
not intimidate or even bother most employees. 139 In another empirical study,
Professor Laura Cooper found that various forms of employer conduct that
the Board has declared to constitute illegal "interference" with employees'
union support did not in fact reduce employee support of unionization. 140
Allentown Mack thus puts into question many significant and wellestablished Board doctrines. As important as that is, the challenge that
Allentown Mack poses to the Board is broader and more fundamental than
that, for it allows a federal court of appeals to reverse any Board decision
with which it disagrees, for whatever reason. It does so by mandating that
fact-fmding by the Board and its ADs be nothing more than a
straightforward process of looking at all the evidence in the record and
drawing logical inferences from that evidence. Even more importantly,
Allentown Mack specifically requires the Board to draw all inferences that
the evidence demands.1 41 Now, whenever a circuit court disagrees with the
Board's resolution of any issue, the court can find that the Board violated
Allentown Mack's rule that the Board draw the inferences "demanded" by
the evidence. The circuit court can find that the Board failed to draw the
"correct" inference, with "correct" meaning the result the circuit court
believes should have been reached. In other words, the Allentown Mack

Michael C. Harper & Samuel Estreicher, LABOR LAw 355-58 (4th ed. 1996) (summarizing the
articles discussing Getman, Goldberg and Herman's methodology). Notwithstanding the
controversy, several circuit court decisions have favorably cited the Getman, Goldberg, &
Herman study, suggesting that circuit courts would probably have little hesitation in relying
on its empirical findings. See, e.g., Skyline Distribs. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 403, 409 (D.C. Cir.
1996); NLRB v. Precise Castings, Inc., 915 F.2d 1160, 1161 (7th Cir. 1990); NLRB v. Best
Prods. Co., 765 F.2d 903,912 (9th Cir. 1985); NLRB v. Village IX, 723 F.2d 1360, 1368 (7th
Cir. 1983); Certainteed Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 1042, 1054 (lIth Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 118-19.
139. Id. at 149.
140. See Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election
Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's
Gissel Decision, 79 N.W. U. L. REv. 87 (1984).
141. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text for a discussion Allentown Mack's
rulings on Board decision-making.
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decision serves as a convenient basis for circuit courts to engage in what is,
essentially, unfettered review of Board decisions.
In Professor Flynn's article on the Board's "hiding the ball," she
explains, and ultimately endorses, the Board's main reason for disguising its
policymaking as fact-finding: to protect its policies from reversal by a
federal judiciary that is for the most part opposed to the policies and goals of
the National Labor Relations Act. 142 If that was the objective of the Board's
ball-hiding strategy, the federal judiciary has now trumped it. Allentown
Mack gives federal appellate judges the means to reverse Board fact-finding
whenever they so desire. After Allentown Mack, Board fact-finding is more
vulnerable to judicial reversal than Board policymaking.
D. Allentown Mack in the Circuit Courts
Many federal appellate courts are already relying on Allentown Mack to
overturn Board decisions. The most significant example is the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, whose rulings are
especially important to the Board because the Act provides that a party
appealing a Board decision always has the option of bringing the appeal to
the D.C. Circuit, which makes the D.C. Circuit the only court with potential
jurisdiction over all the Board's decisions.t 43 The first D.C. Circuit decision
in which the court relied on Allentown Mack to overturn a Board decision
was Matthews Readymix, Inc. v. NLRB,I44 in which the court ruled that the
Board had erred in holding that the employer violated § 8(a)(5) when it
withdrew recognition from the Teamsters union. The Teamsters union had
gone on strike against Matthews Readymix, and within nine days the
company had hired permanent replacements to supplant all the strikers.
Within the next two weeks, nearly all the replacement employees signed
petitions stating they did not want to be represented by the Teamsters, and
142. See Aynn, supra note 4, at 421-45 (section on ''The Costs and Benefits of 'Hiding
the Ball"'); id. at 445-46 (summarizing Professor Aynn's conclusion that "the Board's
roundabout ways result in a greater effectuation of the Act's purposes than would be achieved
were the Board to abandon its present methods and open the door to closer judicial
supervision").
143. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 16O(f) ("Any person aggrieved by
a final order of the Board ... may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of
appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been
engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such a court a written petition praying
that the order of the Board be modified or set aside.") (emphasis added).
144. 165 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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based on those decertification petitions the employer withdraw recognition
of the Teamsters. 145 The Board found that it was illegal for the employer to
rely on the employee petitions as a basis for withdrawing recognition
because those petitions were "tainted" by application forms (completed by
about two-thirds of the replacement employees) that illegally asked whether
the applicant was a member of a union. 146
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by explaining that in reviewing the
Board's decision the court would be "mindful" of the Supreme Court's
holding in Allentown Mack "that when 'the Board purports to be engaging in
simple fact-finding ... it is not free to prescribe what inferences from the
evidence it will accept and reject, but must draw all those inferences that the
evidence fairly demands. "'147 The court found that the Board failed to fulfill
this obligation with respect to the fact that the replacement employees who
did not see the illegal application form also signed decertification petitions;
the court held that in light of this fact "[t]he only fair and sensible inference
is that there was no causal connection between the application form and the
petitions."148 The D.C. Circuit also noted that there was testimony at the
unfair labor practice hearing that some replacement workers had expressed
fear that they would lose their jobs once the union ended the strike, and the
court held that "[t]he only reasonable inference" that could be drawn given
this evidence was that "their [the replacement employees'] expressed fear of
being discharged because they were replacements, not the unmentioned but
lingering effect of a question on the application for employment they had
filled out, motivated them to sign the petitions."149
A few months after issuing Matthews Readymix, the D.C. Circuit again
relied on Allentown Mack to overrule a Board decision in Warshawsky &
Co. v. NLRB.150 The D.C. Circuit reversed the Board's finding that when a
union distributed a handbill protesting the wages and benefits paid by a
subcontractor, the union did not have the illegal intent of encouraging
employees of the general contractor and other "neutral" employers to stop
performing work. On review, the D.C. Circuit declared that, given the parties
145.
146.

Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 75-77. The Board found, and the employer did not contest, that the question

about union membership on the application form constituted illegally interrogation of
applicants under Section 8(a)(1).
147. Id. at 77 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359
(1998».
148. Id. at 79.
149. Id.
150. 182 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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had stipulated to the facts, "[t]he case turns only on the reasonableness of
the inferences the Board did, and did not draw, from the raw stipulated
facts."151 The court next stressed that Allentown Mack commanded that the
Board "must draw all those inferences that the evidence fairly demands."152
The D.C. Circuit then asserted, "We think that the evidence does 'fairly
demand' the inference that the union sought to induce the neutral employees
to walk off the job site."153
The D.C. Circuit's 2001 decision in Alldata Corp. v. NLRB154
demonstrates how an appellate court can use Allentown Mack as a vehicle to
substitute its view of the facts for that of the Board. In Alldata, the employer
asserted that it discharged a salesperson for "failure to maintain sales
volume,"155 while the Board inferred that the employer's motive for the
discharge was the unlawful one of retaliating against the employee for
representing co-workers in complaining about working conditions. 156 The
Board drew its inference of unlawful motive from such circumstances as
"the timing of the discharge in that it occurred shortly after Abbadessa's
voicing of employee complaints . . . the disparity in [the employer's]
treatment of Abbadessa and other underperforrning sales people; and the
inconsistency between commending and rewarding Abbadessa for his sales
performance and then shortly thereafter firing him for alleged poor
performance."157 The D.C. Circuit rejected the Board's finding of motive,
but the court also did not endorse the employer's stated motive of firing the
employee for poor sales. Instead, the D.C. Circuit found another motive on
its own-that Alldata had fired the employee for his "extraordinary" act of
proposing a new agreement with one of Alldata's contractors, and even
asserting that this was the "obvious" motive for the discharge.1 58 The D.C.
Circuit then justified the substitution of its inference for that of the Board by
declaring that "[the Board's] inference drawn from the circumstances is
unreasonable" and cited Allentown Mack for support. 159
at 953.
(quoting Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 378).
153.
The evidence that compelled that inference, according to the court, was "[t]he
handbills themselves, the time, place, and manner of their distribution, the simultaneous
conversations between the union agents and the neutral employees, and the subsequent
response of those employees." [d. at 953-54.
154. 245 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
155. [d. at 806.
156. [d. at 807-08.
157. [d. at 808 (quoting Alldata Corp., 327 N.L.R.B. 127, 127 n.2 (1998».
158. [d.
159. [d. at 809.
151.

[d.

152.

[d.
[d.
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The D.C. Circuit is not alone in using Allentown Mack to overturn Board
decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has at
least twice relied on Allentown Mack to justify reversing the Board. In Sam's
Club v. NLRB,I60 the Fourth Circuit held that the Board erred in finding that
the employer unfairly (and unlawfully) disciplined union activist Lawrence
Perez twice for the same infraction. The Fourth Circuit decided that the
Board should have accepted the employer's assertion that the two forms of
discipline had been for two separate infractions. Invoking Allentown Mack's
rule that the Board "'must draw all those inferences that the evidence fairly
demands,"'161 the Fourth Circuit found that the Board "disregarded" what
the court called a "compelling inference" that the employer's assertion was
true, based on evidence that the employer had previously corrected "double
discipline" for another union activist. 162
In Pirelli Cable Corp. v. NLRB,163 the Fourth Circuit relied on
Allentown Mack to overturn the Board's finding that a strike had been
caused by unlawful threats that an employer made in a letter to all
employees. In discussing the standard of review, the Fourth Circuit quoted
Allentown Mack's language on inferences, and then declared, "[c]ourts
performing substantial evidence review, therefore, must examine whether
the Board considered all of the reasonable inferences compelled by the
evidence in reaching its decision."I64 Based on its own review of the
hearing testimony on the employees' motivations for striking, the Fourth
Circuit inferred that the motivation for the employees' strike was "their
refusal to accept their employer's demand for economic concessions,"165 and
the court faulted the Board for failing to "acknowledge this obvious and
reasonable inference."166 The Fourth Circuit found that this failure violated
the rule of Allentown Mack because "[t]he Board did not examine all of the
reasonable inferences that should be drawn from the evidence,"167 and
therefore the Board's decision was invalid.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also raised
Allentown Mack as the basis for overturning a Board ruling. The Eighth
Circuit held in NLRB v. MDI Commercial Services that the Board erred in
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

165.
166.
167.

173 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1999).
[d. at 244 (quoting Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. 359, 378 (1998».
[d.

141 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 1998).
at 514.
at 519.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

(citing Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 368-70.)
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ignoring an employee's failure to testify in a case alleging he was unlawfully
discharged. 168 The court referred to the common law maxim that an adverse
inference should be drawn when a party fails to testify,169 but the court
considerably strengthened the force of that principle by holding that the
Board's failure to make such an adverse inference violated Allentown
Mack's requirement that the Board '''must draw all inferences that the
evidence fairly demands."'170
Judge Lay dissented from the court's holding, stressing that "the
fundamental flaw in the majority's reasoning that the adverse inference rule
should be applied is that it overlooks the fact that the inference is solely
within the Board's power, as the fact-finder, to draw."l71 Judge Lay further
contended that "there is no basis for this court to rely upon such an inference
in reviewing the administrative record" and that "[iln making such an
inference, the majority wrongfully usurps the role of the trier of fact."l72
Judge Lay overlooked that the majority did have a basis for drawing an
inference that the Board failed to draw-Allentown Mack invites appellate
courts to do just that. And Allentown Mack will continue to enable appellate
courts to substitute their judgments for those of the Board anytime they
wish. The only way the Board can avoid consistent displacement of its
judgment by appellate courts is to reform its approach to decision-making.

ID. THE BOARD'S POLICYMAKING ROLE: KEy TO PRESERVING RELEVANCE
To avoid being pushed into irrelevance by Allentown Mack, the Board
must change its approach to decision-making. Most obviously, the Board
must revise its approach to the issues where Professor Flynn has documented
that the Board has consistently "hidden the ball."173 Unfortunately for the
Board, the threat Allentown Mack poses to its rulings extends far beyond the
issues identified by Professor Flynn. That is clearly demonstrated by the
168.

175 F.3d 621,628 (8th Cir. 1999).
at 628 (citing Rockingham Machine-Lunex Co. v. NLRB, 665 F.2d 303,
304-05 (8th Cir. 1981»; Int'l Union, UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1335-40 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Meier v. Comm'r, 199 F.2d 392, 396 (8th Cir. 1952». In dissent, Judge Lay observed
that this maxim was known as "the absent witness rule" and that it "finds its origins in the
common law." [d. at 632 (Lay, J., concurring and dissenting).
170. [d. at 628 (quoting Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 378).
171. [d. at 633 (citing NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 597 (1941); NLRB v.
Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 461 (1940».
172. [d. at 633.
173. See supra Part 1I.c. (summarizing Professor Flynn's discussion of cases in which
the Board disguises policymaking as fact-finding).
169.

[d.
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court of appeals decisions that have already relied on Allentown Mack to
reverse the Board: those decisions reversed the Board on a variety of issues,
and none of those issues was one discussed by Professor Flynn.174 In all
those decisions, the courts showed a marked tendency to assume that Board
conclusions were merely "inferences" based on facts, which permitted the
courts to use Allentown Mack to declare erroneous any inferences with
which the courts disagreed. Thus, any Board ruling that an appellate court
can characterize as an "inference" will be reviewed under the Allentown
Mack standard and will therefore be readily reversible.
This means that for the Board to obtain more deferential review, the
Board must make clear that the ruling is not just an inference. In Allentown
Mack, while the Supreme Court was making it easier for courts to reverse
the Board's inferences, the Court also reaffIrmed that Board rulings made to
"further[] legal or policy goals" were entitled to deference from the courts as
long as they were reasonable and consistent with the statute. 175 Accordingly,
the clearest way for the Board to obtain deferential review of a ruling is to
make clear that the ruling is a policy determination and not just an inference.
In other words, far from "hiding" the policy ball, the Board should openly
highlight the policy bases of its rulings.
That would be a major change in the Board's decision-making approach.
In the overwhelming majority of its decisions, the Board does not refer to
policy bases for its rulings, or make any reference to policy at all. For the
most part, the Board reserves discussion of policy considerations for cases in
which it makes a major policy change. 176 In all other cases, the Board leaves
unstated that its rulings are based on prior policy determinations.
The Board cannot assume that appeals courts will recognize the implicit
policy nature of Board rulings and, hence, defer to them. When a Board
decision makes no reference to policy judgments or policy considerations,
the reviewing court has no reason to take the time and effort to try to discern
policy grounds for the Board's ruling, and nothing to discourage it from
taking the tempting course of making the ruling the court prefers. For the
174. See supra Part II.D. (discussing court decisions reversing Board rulings on the
basis of Allentown Mack).
175. See Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 378.
176. See, e.g., Kolkka Tables and Finnish-American Saunas, 335 N.L.R.B. No. 69,
2001 WL 1044723 (2001); Levitz Furniture Co., 333 N.L.R.B. No. lOS, 2001 WL 314139
(2001); Epilepsy Found. of N.E. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 92, 2000 WL 967066 (2000),
enforced in relevant part, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., ;\30
N.L.R.B. 152 (1999) (examples of recent Board decisions in which the Board discussed
policy considerations as a basis for overturning precedent).
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Board to avoid "Allentown Mack" review of its rulings, and the judicial
displacement of its judgment that so often results from such review, it will
be up to the Board to assert explicitly that its rulings are policy
determinations.
When the Board openly makes or reaffirms policy, it has compelling
grounds for demanding judicial deference to its policy decisions. As this Part
will explain, the National Labor Relations Act, the prevailing administrative
law standards for judicial review of agency decisions, and important
practical considerations all require judicial deference to Board
policymaking.

A. The NLRA Establishes the Board as the Favored Policymaker
It is of course the United States Congress that has the primary and
paramount authority to make labor relations policy.177 In enacting the
National Labor Relations Act ("the Act"), Congress chose to delegate much
of this authority to the National Labor Relations Board. 178 In § 10 of the
Act, the Board was "empowered ... to prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this title) ...."179 In § 9,
Congress gave the Board exclusive authority over issues concerning how
employees select their bargaining representatives.1 80 And in § 6, Congress
expressly gave the Board authority "to make, amend, and rescind . . . such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
[statute].n lSl
Given the nature of the Act, the authority Congress gave the Board was
necessarily policymaking authority. If the Act had defined employee rights,
unfair labor practices, and representational principles in a detailed and
precise manner, then the Board's role would be limited to carrying out
policies already specifically defined by Congress. Instead, the language of
the Act is broad and ambiguous, and leaves many policy questions

177. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the
constitutional authority of Congress to make labor relations policy).
178. See generally 1 JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF TIlE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD 130-148 (1974) (discussing the legislative history of the National Labor
Relations Act and Congress's decision to give labor policymaking authority to the Board).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2002).
180. See 29 U.S.C. § 159; see also HARDIN, supra note 7, at 28 ("Section 9 ... gave
the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over questions of employee representation.").
181. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2002).
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unresolved.1 82 As then-Professor, now Second Circuit Judge Ralph K.
Winter explained, "Much of the need for a specialized agency to administer
the National Labor Relations Act might be attributed to the ambiguity of
many of the provisions of that statute."183 As examples, Winter discussed
some of the key provisions of the Act: § 8(a)(l), which makes it an unfair
labor practice for employers to "interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees" in exercising their rights under the Act; § 8(b)(1)(A) which
forbids unions ''to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise" of such
rights; and §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(d), which together make it illegal for employers
to refuse to "bargain . . . in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment."184
The broad and vague language of the Act makes it necessary for the
Board to resolve specific policy issues. The fact that the statute's generality
forces the Board to act as a policymaker was promptly recognized by the
U.S. Supreme Court in two decisions issued within ten years of the Act's
passage. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,185 the Court held:
A statute expressive of such large public policy as that on which the National
Labor Relations Board is based must be broadly phrased and necessarily
carries with it the task of administrative application. . . . [I]n the nature of
things Congress could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems for
circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of
remedies to effectuate these policies in an infinite variety of specific
situations. Congress met these difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means
to end to the empiric process of administration. The exercise of the process
was committed to the Board, subject to limited judicial review. 186
Similarly, in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,187 the Court concluded,
The Wagner Act did not undertake the impossible task of specifying in
precise and unmistakable language each incident which would constitute an
unfair labor practice. On the contrary, that Act left to the Board the work of

182.
PROCESSES,

See Juuus G.

LAw

GETMAN

AND PRACTICE

& BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC

4 (1988) ("The language of the Act ... is overly general,

often confusing and contradictory.").
183. Ralph K. Winter, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the
Coun, 1968 SUP. CT. REv. 53, 56.
184. Id. at 56-57.

185.
186.
187.

313 u.S. 177 (1941).
Id. at 194.
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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applying the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite
combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its terms. 188
Congress not only intended the Board to make labor policy, but more
importantly for the issue of judicial review, Congress deliberately chose to
have the Board predominate over the courts in making such policy. There is
some evidence of this in specific documents of legislative history. For
example, the Act's sponsor, Senator Wagner, stated during the debates over
the statute, "For years lawyers and economists have pleaded for a dignified
administrative tribunal ... entitled to deal quasi-judicially with issues with
which the courts have neither the time nor the special facilities to cope."189
Even stronger proof that Congress favored the Board over the courts in
making labor policy comes from the structure of the Act and the historical
context in which the statute was enacted. Only three years before passage of
the National Labor Relations Act, Congress had passed the NorrisLaGuardia Act of 1932,190 which stripped federal courts of their jurisdiction
over enforcement of "yellow dog contracts" (contracts in which employees
agreed not to affiliate with unions) and (more importantly) over granting
injunctions in any case involving a labor dispute.1 91 As scholars have
observed, the Norris-LaGuardia Act "was an eloquent legislative indictment
of judicial treatment of union activity"192 resulting from the federal courts'
"long and sorry history of dealing with labor problems."193 Three years after
Norris-LaGuardia, in passing the National Labor Relations Act, Congress
continued the process of diminishing the role of courts in the labor area by
creating an alternative to the courts, the National Labor Relations Board,
and giving it primary and sometimes even exclusive authority over labor law

[d. at 798.
189. 1 NLRB, LEGISlATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RElATIONS Acr of1935,
at 1428 (1985).
190. Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-115).
191. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2002). The provision on yellow dog contracts first
"declared [such contracts] to be contrary to the public policy of the United States" and then
stated that they "shall not be enforceable" in federal court. See 29 U.S.C. § 103.
192. B. MELTZER & S. HENDERSON, LABOR LAw CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 28
(3d ed. 1985).
193. Lee Modjeska, The NLRB Litigational Processes: A Reply to Chairman Dotson,
23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 399,403 (1988). Professor Modjeska documented this "long and
sorry history" by describing the courts' use of antitrust law, conspiracy doctrine and
injunctions to undermine labor activity. [d. at 401-03.
188.
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issues. 194 As Professor Winter has noted, in the Act, Congress "established
broad lines of labor policy, the further elaboration of which was left to the
Labor Board rather than the courts."195 Moreover, the Act placed limits on
the ability of courts to review Board decisions by omitting any means of
direct appeal of Board decisions on representational matters 196 and
providing that in reviews of Board decisions in unfair labor practice cases,
''the fmdings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall in like manner
be conclusive."197 This context and structure of the Act leads to the
conclusion that, as Professor Winter put it, "The creation of the Board . . .
may fairly be viewed as the result of congressional dissatisfaction with
judicial lawmaking in the area of labor law."198
Soon after the Act's passage, the Supreme Court acknowledged and
endorsed the Board's primacy over the appellate courts in making labor
policy. In its 1941 decision in Phelps Dodge, the Supreme Court actually
admonished the appellate courts to leave policymaking to the Board:
"Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for
administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the
Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding
unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious
domain of policy."199 -Later in the decision, the Court reemphasized that the
role of the courts was limited in relation to the Board's broad policymaking
authority, stating "[ w]e believe that the procedure we have indicated will
likewise effectuate the policies of the Act by making workable the system of
restricted judicial review in relation to the wide discretionary authority
which Congress has given the Board."2oo
194. As noted above, the statute gives the Board the authority to initially determine
whether unfair labor practices have been committed, and gives the Board exclusive authority
over representational issues. See supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Sections 10 and 9 of the Act); see also GETMAN & POGREBIN, supra note 182, at 1 ("The
role of the courts, already limited by the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, was to be
further reduced by giving the Board exclusive jurisdiction over labor law questions, subject to
limited judicial review.").
195. Winter, supra note 183, at 59 n.5.
196. See 29 U.S.c. §§ 159, 160 (1994).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
198. Winter, supra note 183, at 59 n.5.
199. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
200. [d. at 196. These statements in Phelps Dodge were not dicta because the Court
did in fact defer to the Board's judgment on several issues in the case. It should be noted,
however, that on one issue the Court did not entirely defer to the Board. The Board had
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the Board has the
primary authority to make policy regarding the Act, and that courts should
generally avoid interfering with the Board's policymaking. In the decade
after Phelps Dodge, the Supreme Court held, in a declaration it has
reasserted many times since, that "[t]he function of striking [a] balance to
effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate
responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National
Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review."201
The Supreme Court most clearly explicated the relationship between the
Board and the courts in two decisions in the late 1970s. In Ford Motor Co.
(Chicago Stamping Plant) v. NLRB,202 the Court reconfirmed that Congress
had granted the Board predominant authority to make labor policy:

It is thus evident that Congress made a conscious decision to continue its
delegation to the Board of the primary responsibility of marking out the
scope of the statutory language and of the statutory duty to bargain. This
case, therefore, is one of those situations in which we should 'recognize
without hesitation the primary function and responsibility of the Board'

decided that it would not reduce back pay by amounts that discharged workers failed to earn,
on the ground that calculating these amounts would be too administratively burdensome. The
Court rejected this rationale, stating that the Board "overestimates administrative difficulties
and underestimates its administrative resourcefulness," and finding that the administrative
burden was outweighed by the "fairness" of mitigating damages. See id. at 197-98. Even on
this issue, though, the Court stressed the primacy of the Board's policymaking power: the
Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Second Circuit's decision that directly modified the
Board's order, declaring that "the Board's order should not have been modified by the court
below. The matter should have been left to the Board for determination ...." Moreover, on
the mitigation issue, the Court also emphasized that Congress had granted the Board great
discretion in making labor policy. The Court explained, "The remedy of back pay, it must be
remembered, is entrusted to the Board's discretion .... And in applying its authority over back
pay orders, the Board has not used stereotyped formulas but has availed itself of the freedom
given it by Congress to attain just results in diverse, complicated situations .... The Board has
a wide discretion to keep the present matter within reasonable bounds through flexible
procedural devices." [d. at 197-98 (citations omitted).
201. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) (emphasis
added) quoted in NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1861, 1873 n.5 (2001)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); Charles D. Bonanno
Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404,409 (1982); American Broadcasting Co. v. Writers
Guild, bk, 437 U.S. 411, 431 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236
(1963).
202. 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
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which is that 'of applying the general provisions of the Act to the
complexities of industrial life ... .'203
The Court noted that appellate courts would review the Board's decisions,
but stressed that they should not substitute their policy judgments for those
of the Board: "Of course, the judgment of the Board is subject to judicial
review; but if its construction of the statute is reasonably defensible, it
should not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view
of the statute."204 In Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB,205 the Supreme Court
also acknowledged, "[i]t is the Board on which Congress conferred the
authority to develop and apply fundamental national labor policy,"206 and
the Court sharply contrasted the limited role of the appellate courts: ''The
judicial role is narrow: The rule which the Board adopts is judicially
reviewable for consistency with the Act, and for rationality, but if it satisfies
those criteria, the Board's application of the rule, if supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole, must be enforced."207
In sum, the National Labor Relations Act establishes the Board as the
chief policymaker in federal labor law. Through the statute, Congress
deliberately chose to limit the role of the appellate courts in reviewing Board
policy making. The Supreme Court has recognized and supported the Board's
dominance in policymaking, and has exhorted appellate courts to respect and
defer to the Board's policymaking authority.

B. Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Decisions: The Chevron
Standard
Judicial deference to Board policymaking is also prescribed by leading
principles of administrative law. As a federal administrative agency, the
Board is bound by federal administrative law in general, and in particular by
the Supreme Court's decisions on judicial review of administrative agency
actions. Since 1984, the dominant administrative law precedent on judicial
review of decisions by administrative agencies has been the Supreme Court's
ruling in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 208 As
one treatise writer recently put it, ''The world of judicial review of agency

203.
204.

205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 496 (citations omitted).
Id. at 497.

437 U.S. 483 (1978).
Id. at 500.
Id. at 501 (citations omitted).

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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legal conclusions is now clearly the world of Chevron. "209 Under a proper
application of the Chevron standard, the Board's policymaking authority
should remain largely free from interference by the federal appellate courts.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court established a two-part standard that courts
were to apply whenever they reviewed an agency's interpretation of a statute
the agency was responsible for administering:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 210
Applying this standard to Board decisions, the first question an appellate
court must address is whether Congress ''unambiguously expressed intent"
regarding "the precise question at issue." In the case of the Board, the
answer to this question will almost always be no, there is no clear
congressional intent. As discussed above, the NLRA is mostly written in
broad and ambiguous language. 211 More particularly, the provisions that the
Board is most often involved in applying are all phrased in vague. and
general terms. More than 50% of all unfair labor practice charges considered
by the Board claim violations of § 8(a)(3), which prohibits "discrimination"
by employers without ever defining that tenn or explaining what constitutes
discriminatory conduct. 212 The provision that is next most commonly
invoked is § 8(a)(5),213 which makes it illegal for employers to "refuse to
bargain collectively" or to fail to bargain "in good faith,"214 while leaving it
209.

GARY

LAWSON, FEDERAL AoMINISTRATIVE LAw 588 (1998).

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
211. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
212. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2002). The only issue that § 8(a)(3) discusses in greater
detail is when payment of union dues can be made a condition of employment. See id.
213. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2002).
214. See 29 U.S.c. § 158(d) (2002) (defining "bargain collectively" as meaning to
210.

"confer in good faith").
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for the Board to determine the meaning of the vague phrase "in good faith."
Meanwhile, in the thousands of representation cases the Board administers
every year, the statute gives the Board such vague directives as asking it to
decide if there is a "question of representation," to define "appropriate" units
for union elections, and to determine which employees are "eligible" to vote
in a union election. 215 Thus, far more often than not, the Board will be
applying and construing provisions where there is no clear Congressional
intent.
Accordingly, if courts were to fairly and reasonably apply the Chevron
standard to Board decisions, they almost always would proceed to the
second stage. At that stage, courts must accept the Board's decision as long
as it is a "permissible" interpretation of the statute. So as long as the Board
stays within the broad outlines of the Act, courts must defer to its
policymaking decisions.
In 2001, in United States v. Mead Corp.,216 the Supreme Court issued a
major ruling regarding the application of the Chevron standard of judicial
review. Although it is too soon to say whether the world of judicial review is
now "the world of Mead," Justice Scalia did assert in his dissent in the case
that "the Mead doctrine . . . has today replaced the Chevron
doctrine .... "217 Certainly Mead is a significant decision that now must be
considered in assessing judicial review of Board policymaking.
In Mead, the Supreme Court found that the level of deference courts
owed to an agency's decision depended on the degree to which Congress had
delegated authority to that agency. The Court observed that when Congress
explicitly delegates authority to an agency to define a specific statutory
provision, the agency's interpretation must be reviewed under a highly
deferential standard. The agency's decision is upheld "unless procedurally
defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."218 The Court then explained that the Chevron standard was created
to apply to situations where Congress's delegation of authority was implicit:

215. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2002). Although courts cannot hear direct appeals of the
Board's decisions in representation cases, courts can and do review Board representation
rulings in Section 8(a)(5) cases where employers accused of "refusal to bargain" defend by
claiming that the union's selection as a representative is invalid. See Cox, ET AL., LABOR LAW
113-14 (13th ed. 2001).
216. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
217. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 227 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 and United States v. Morton, 467 U.S.
822 (1984)).
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Congress, that is, may not have expressly delegated authority or
responsibility to implement a particular provision. . . . Yet it can still be
apparent from the agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory
circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak
with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a
space in the enacted law .... 219
In these situations of implicit delegation, the Court reaffmned, the Chevron
standard should apply because "a reviewing court has no business rejecting
an agency's exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a
particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency's chosen resolution
seems unwise."220
Under this reasoning, the key to deciding whether the Chevron standard
should be applied in reviewing an agency's application of a statute is
whether Congress implicitly delegated authority to the agency to make that
application. The Supreme Court in Mead found that a "very good indicator"
that Congress had made an implicit delegation was a statutory grant of
authority to an agency "to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication."221 The Court reasoned that when Congress "provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of [law]," then it is fair to
conclude that Congress intended the agency to make binding law. 222 The
Court also held that authority to make rules or adjudications was not
necessarily required,223 as Congress's implicit delegation of authority to
make law could be shown "by some other indication of a comparable
congressional intent. "224
Applying the new Mead standard to the Board, there is conclusive
evidence that Congress implicitly delegated authority to the Board to make
decisions having the force of law. The Board does have the "very good
indicator" of delegated authority that the Court identified in Mead, because
Congress did give the Board authority to adjudicate cases under the Act: §
10 sets out the adjudicative procedures the Board is to use to decide if an
219.
220.

221.
222.
223.

[d. at 229.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 231

("[T]he want of [formal] procedure here does not decide the case, for
we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative
formality was required and none was afforded. ").
224. [d. at 227.
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employer or union is guilty of an unfair labor practice,225 and § 9 authorizes
the Board to conduct hearings in representation cases. 226 Indeed, in Mead
itself, the Supreme Court listed two NLRB cases as examples of
"adjudication cases" where Chevron deference was deemed appropriate. 227
Further evidence that Congress granted the Board implicit lawmaking
authority is found in § 6, where Congress gave the Board authority to engage
in rulemaking,228 though the Board has only once in its history issued a
substantive rule. 229
In sum, current federal administrative law, as embodied in Chevron and
Mead, requires courts to afford considerable deference to the Board's
interpretations and application of the Act. This body of law would provide
further protection to the Board if it openly engaged in the policymaking role
that Congress intended for it.

C. The Board's Practical Advantages Over Courts as a Policymaker
The primacy of the Board over the courts in labor policymaking is
dictated not only by congressional intent, but also by the fact that, as a
practical matter, the Board remains better suited than courts to make labor
relations policy. The National Labor Relations Board is a specialized agency
that is focused exclusively on the National Labor Relations Act. Every day,
day after day, the five members of the Board, their staff lawyers, and the
administrative law judges and regional directors whose decisions the Board
reviews, devote their time and attention entirely to the National Labor
Relations Act. These Board decisionmakeis review thousands of cases each
year, they rule on the same relatively narrow band of issues again and again,
and, consequently, they become thoroughly familiar with these issues and all
their ramifications. By contrast, for federal appellate judges, labor law is but
one small part of an entire body of federal law (and even state law, in
diversity cases) that they must administer. 230 Empirical studies of federal
225.
226.
227.

See 29 U.S.C. § 16O(b) and (c).
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.12 (listing Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392

(1996) and ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994».
228. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2002) (authorizing Board "to make, amend, and rescind ...
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this [statute]").
229. Hardin, :supra note 7, at 738 (Supp. 1999).
230. Winter, :supra note 183, at 60 (making the point that "one who adjudicates
nothing but cases under the National Labor Relations Act will know more about the unique
characteristics of collective bargaining and the impact of the statute in that context than one
who is concerned with the entire body of law").
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circuit courts' workloads have found that NLRB appeals constitute only
about 1% of the courts' dockets. 231 And of this relatively small pool of
cases, a substantial number are settled, so that an even lower percentage of
labor cases are actually decided by appellate judges. 232 Professor Daniel
Meador has contended that when an appellate court does not decide a
"critical mass" of cases in a subject area, the court will perform inadequately
in ruling on such cases,233 and he cited NLRB cases as one type in which
courts were likely to be deficient. 234
Even if one does not accept Professor Meador's "critical mass" theory,
the fact remains that the odds are against an appellate judge's being able to
build up an expertise in labor law and policy. Indeed, some appellate judges
have admitted their lack of labor law expertise. Several years ago, the late
circuit judge Robert Vance said, "In view of the limited volume of labor
cases, it is unrealistic to expect a particular expertise in labor law from the
members of the court."235 Judge Vance's observation has become even more
true in recent years, according to a 2002 speech by First Circuit judge
Sandra Lynch, who told a group of labor lawyers that because the number of
NLRB decisions in the circuit courts has declined dramatically in recent
decades, appellate judges have less expertise in the labor area. 236
Admittedly, some commentators have questioned whether the Board
truly possesses expertise, or utilizes what expertise it does possess. 237 These
critics typically note that the Board rarely refers to empirical studies or
231. See Flynn, supra note 4, at 426 & n.165 (citing Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
. Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990
DUKE L.J. 984, 998, 1015; Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying
the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 603, 604, 624 (1989)
(finding that in 1987, only 561 of the 37,000 appeals filed in the federal circuits involved the
NLRB». See also Susan J. McGolrick, lAbor lAw: Appellate Judges Have Less Expertise in
lAbor lAw as Cases Decline, Lynch Says, 38 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-1 (Feb. 26, 2002)
(discussing speech in which First Circuit judge Sandra Lynch observed that less than 0.5
percent of the circuit's docket involves the NLRB).
232. See Robert S. Vance, A View from the Circuit: A Federal Circuit Judge Views the
NLRA Appellate Scene, 1 LAB. LAw. 39, 39 (1985).
233. Meador, supra note 231, at 619.
234. Id. at 623.
235. Vance, supra note 232, at 39. Judge Vance added that appellate judges were also
unlikely to bring that experience with them to the bench, stating, "It is a fact of life that
lawyers with prior labor experience rarely receive appointments to circuit courts of appeals."
Id.
236.
237.

See McGolrick, supra note 231.
See Flynn supra note 4, at 428-29 nn.174-78 (summarizing books and articles

questioning Board expertise).
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practical knowledge of labor relations or industrial practices. 238 To some
extent, such critics misapprehend the nature of the expertise that the Board
does bring to bear in its decisions. The Board's expertise is not in empirical
labor relations studies, but in the labor policy embodied in the National
Labor Relations Act. As Professor Lee Modjeska (a former Assistant
General Counsel of the Board) has put it, "[t]he specialized competence of
the Board relates to the law of the land, not the law of the shop."239
More importantly for purposes of this article, critics of Board expertise
pay no attention to the question of relative expertise, the Board compared to
the courts. As Professor Winter correctly observed, ''The relevant
comparison is not between Board members and experts in industrial
relations, but between specialists and generalists."240 As "specialists" in
. labor law and policy, the Board's members have a clear advantage over
"generalist" appellate judges. The degree of the Board's advantage is greatly
strengthened when one takes into account, as most critics of Board expertise
do not, that the Board has a permanent career service staff composed of
lawyers, administrative judges and others with many years of labor law
experience and professional service to the Board. 241 When one also takes
into account that much of the appellate courts' work on labor appeals will be
performed by judicial clerks just out of law school, who almost all have
virtually no experience with or knowledge of labor law, the Board's
expertise advantage comes close to being overwhelming.
For all the reasons discussed in this Part, the Board would be on finn
ground to assert openly its primacy over courts in the making of national
labor policy. The Board should boldly exercise its policymaking prerogative.
In decision after decision, it should announce that its ruling. is based on
policy considerations and its responsibility to "fill gaps" in the National
Labor Relations Act. But before discussing how the Board should do that,
this Article must address a looming challenge that some appellate courts are
presenting to the Board's policymaking role.

238.

Id.
Lee Modjeska. In Defense of the NLRB, 33 MERCER L. REv. 851, 855 (1982).
Winter, supra note 183, at 60.
241. See Lee Modjeska. The NLRB Litigational Processes: A Response to Chainnan
Dotson, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 399,472 (1988) ("It does not detract from a long line of
distinguished Board members to note the obvious extent to which the very efficacy of the
administrative process depends upon the quality and continuity of the career service .... That
'cumulative experience' which in the [Supreme] Court's view comprises much of the Board's
'specialized knowledge' necessarily resides in substantial part with the career staff.").

239.
240.
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N. A NEW CHALLENGE TO BOARD POLICYMAKING: THE THEORY THAT
CHEVRON DEFERENCE IS

INAPPLICABLE TO THE BOARD

A. Courts and Commentators Establish the Theory
As discussed in the preceding Part, the Supreme Court's Chevron
standard decrees that when an appellate court is reviewing an administrative
agency's resolution of an issue, and the statute is silent or ambiguous
regarding that issue, the court must defer to the agency's determination as
long as it is "based on a permissible construction of the statute."242 But two
circuits, the Seventh and Fourth, have held that this Chevron standard does
not apply to decisions by the Board, and that appellate courts should apply a
much less deferential standard of review to Board decisions. The Seventh
Circuit decision adopting this view was Bob Evans Farms, Inc. v. NLRB,243
in an opinion written by Judge Cudahy and joined by Judges Coffey and
Kanne. The three-judge panel in Bob Evans reviewed, and ultimately
overruled, a Board decision holding that a walkout of restaurant employees
was concerted activity protected by the Act and that it was therefore illegal
for the employer to fIre employees for the walkout.
After summarizing the facts of the case in Part I of its decision, the court
devoted all of Part II (fIve pages) to determining the appropriate standard of
judicial review of the Board's decision. 244 The court began by noting that
there was a dispute between the parties as to whether the court should apply
the Chevron standard of review: the Board asserted that the court must apply
the Chevron standard,245 while the employer and the amicus curiae Labor
Policy Association (LPA) contended that application of the Chevron
standard would be "misplaced" because "Chevron applies only in the
context of agency rulemaking as opposed to agency adjudication."246
The Seventh Circuit immediately accepted a central premise of the
employerlLPA position, that Chevron applied only to rulemaking or
"rulemaking-like" agency decisions. 247 The court found that Chevron
242.
243.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
163 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998).
244. See id. at 1016-20.
245. Id. at 1016.
246. Id. at 1017.
247. Brief of Amicus Curiae Labor Policy Association at 16-30, Efco Corp. v. NLRB,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909 (4th Cir. May 17, 2000) (No. 99-1147) available at
http://www.lpa.orgl/papubliclpolicy/amicus/briefsJEFCO_brief.pdf; Brief of Amicus Curiae
Labor Policy Association at 3-13, Bob Evans Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir.
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involved a "rulemaking or quasi-legislative function imbued with
policymaking responsibilities delegated by Congress."248 But the Seventh
Circuit also recognized that many adjudications could be "rulemaking-like":
"the functions of rulemaking and adjudication are not mutually exclusive;
frequently adjudication is the vehicle for a statutory interpretation that is
functionally equivalent to a rule. "249 The court noted that this was especially
true in the case of the Board because the Board "'has chosen to promulgate
virtually all of the legal rules in its field through adjudication rather than
rulemaking. "'250 The Seventh Circuit explained, "[s]ince the Board
develops general rules in the course of adjudication, there will invariably be
occasions when a special degree of deference [Chevron deference] is
appropriate."251 This meant, of course, that the converse was also true: that
except for these "occasions," it was not appropriate to apply the Chevron
standard to Board adjudications.
The Seventh Circuit next discussed how to determine when the Chevron
standard should, and should not, be applied to a Board decision. The court
identified "the prominence or obscurity of a legislative purpose or of
policymaking itself' as the key factor to consider in that determination. 252
The Seventh Circuit also made clear that it believed that the "obscure" far
outnumbered the "prominent," as the court declared that "[w]hile the Board
can, and occasionally does, make rules in the course of adjudication, the
bulk of its orders have only a slight legislative dimension."253 The Seventh
Circuit additionally identified as a "significant" factor "the extent to which
the subject matter invokes the special expertise of the Board," and stated that
such cases "warranted" Chevron deference. 254
1998)
(Nos.
97-4096,
98-1119)
available
at
http://www.lpa.org/papublicJpolicy/amicuslbriefslBob_Evans_brief.pdf.
248. Bob Evans, 163 F.3d at 1018.
249. Id. (citation omitted).
250. Id. (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359
(1998».
25 I. Id. By "special degree of deference," the court clearly meant Chevron deference.
As authority, the court cited Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 397-99 (1996), and
added the parenthetical "(applying Chevron to Board adjudication)." And as additional
authority, the Seventh Circuit cited two other decisions in which courts applied the Chevron
standard in reviewing Board decisions, Mid-America Care Foundation v. NLRB, 148 F.3d
638 (6th Cir. 1998), and NLRB v. Webcor Packaging, Inc., 118 F.3d H15, 1119 (6th Cir.
1997).
252. Bob Evans, 163 F.3d at 1019.
253.
254.

Id.
Id. at 1019 (citing Ferriso v. NLRB, 125 F.3d 865, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1997) and

NLRB v. Americare-New Lexington Health Care Center, 124 F.3d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1997».
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In applying these factors to the case at issue, the Seventh Circuit further
explicated its views on when Board decisions were entitled to Chevron
deference. The court asserted that the central question in the case, whether
certain employee conduct was protected concerted activity, "cannot be said
to involve policy choices or rulemaking in the legislative sense."255 Instead,
the court found, in deciding whether employee conduct was protected by
statute, "the Board was engaged in the classic judicial exercise of resolving
competing claims under the statute."256 In this way, the Seventh Circuit,
which had earlier acknowledged the traditional distinction between findings
of fact and conclusions of law,257 further subdivided conclusions of law into
"legislative" determinations and "judicial" determinations. And the Seventh
Circuit declared that making judicial determinations was "a function which
does not implicate the Supreme Court's central concerns in Chevron."258
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Board's argument that the court
should apply the Chevron standard in reviewing the Board's decision, and
the court instead applied what it called a "traditional deference" standard,
under which it reversed the Board's decision. 259
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the
Chevron standard inapplicable to a Board adjudication in its unpublished
decision in Efco Corp. v. NLRB.26O In a per curium opinion by a three-judge
panel,261 the Fourth Circuit considered what standard of review to apply to a
Board decision that held that the employer violated § 8(a)(2) of the Act by
establishing and exerting control over three employee committees that the
Board found to be "labor organizations" under § 2(5) of the Act.

255. Bob Evans, 163 F.3d at 1019. As this article will discuss below, the
determination of what kinds of employee conduct are, and are not, covered by the Act in fact
involves very significant policy judgments. See infra notes 333-348 and accompanying text.
256. Id. at 1020 (emphasis added).
257. Id. at 1017.
258. Id. at 1020. There is no support in Chevron for this artificial distinction between
"legislative" and "judicial" determinations by an agency. See infra notes 314-16 and
accompanying text.
259. Id. The Seventh Circuit did note that even under the Chevron standard, it likely
would have reversed the Board's decision, because "Chevron deference is also premised on
the reasonableness of the agency construction." The court stated that "[wJhichever the
preferred standard-traditional deference or Chevron . . . the Board's decision does not
survive." Id.
260. 2000 U.s. App. LEXIS 10909, at *12 (4th Cir. May 17,2000).
261. The panel was composed of circuit judges Luttig and Traxler and federal district
court judge G. Ross Anderson sitting by designation.
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The Board contended in Efco, as it had in Bob Evans Farms, that the
court should apply the Chevron standard in reviewing its decision. 262 The
Fourth Circuit responded by quoting Bob Evans Farms in declaring that "the
applicability of Chevron in this context is by no means clear."263 Similar to
the Seventh Circuit in Bob Evans Farms, the Fourth Circuit construed
Chevron as meaning that courts should defer to an administrative agency
when it "acts within [its] rulemaking or policy-formation discretion,"264 and
held that whether to apply the Chevron standard depended on "whether or
not the Board adopted what amounts to a 'rule' in its decision."265
The Fourth Circuit then adopted the same approach the Seventh Circuit
had used in Bob Evans Farms, by ascertaining the extent of "legislating" or
policymaking that was involved in the Board's decision. The Fourth Circuit
found that the Board's "determination" in the case ''that the committees
were labor organizations and the employer interfered with them cannot be
said to involve policy choices or rulemaking in the legislative sense."266
Quoting Bob Evans Farms, the Fourth Circuit found that in making its
decision, "'the Board was engaged in the classic judicial exercise of
resolving competing claims under the statute, a function which does not
implicate the Supreme Court's central concerns in Chevron."'267 Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that Chevron deference was inappropriate and
instead applied "traditional deference standards in reviewing the Board's
decision. "268
The theory that most Board decisions are not entitled to Chevron
deference, which the Seventh Circuit and Fourth Circuit have adopted,
appears to have originated with the Labor Policy Association, an employer
advocacy group that represents more than 250 private sector employers on
labor relations issues. 269 The Labor Policy Association filed amicus briefs
in both Bob Evans Farms and Efco. 270 Both briefs were authored by The
262.
263.
264.

Efco. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909, at *9-10.
Id. at *10 (quoting Bob Evans Farms, 163 F.3d at 1016).
Id. at *10-11 (emphasis added).
Id. at *11.
Id. at *12.
Id. (quoting Bob Evans Farms. 163 F.3d at 1020).
Id. The Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld the Board's decision under that standard.

265.
266.
267.
268.
See id. at *13-19.
269. Susan J. McGolrick, Management Group Seeks NAFTA Review of u.s. Actions
on Employee Participation, 71 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-ll (April 14. 1999) (describing the
Labor Policy Association).
270. See Bob Evans, 163 F.3d at 1013; Efco, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909, at *1
(identifying Labor Policy Association as the only amicus to file a brief).
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Labor Policy Association's vice president and general counsel Daniel V.
Yager.271 In both briefs, Mr. Yager asserted that Board decisions did not
warrant Chevron deference,272 a position he explained in greater detail in a
1998 law journal article that he co-authored (with then-law clerk Joseph J.
LoBue), Is the Chevron Standard Too High-Octane for the NLRB?273 The
Yager and LoBue article asserted that the Supreme Court had not
"authoritatively" resolved whether the Chevron doctrine applied to
adjudications,274 and that it was therefore an open question whether Board
decisions were entitled to Chevron deference. The article contended that this
question should be answered in the negative, for a number of reasons.
.
The article's main argument was that the Chevron standard, particularly
the deferential "second prong" of that standard, applied only to agency
decisions that "create new law" (e.g., rulemaking) and "not those that
interpret existing law" (e.g., adjudication).275 This argument was based
largely on the language of Chevron. The article noted that the Supreme
Court defined the first stage of the Chevron standard as determining whether
congressional intent was clear from the language of the statute, and that [i]f
it was "that is the end of the matter."276 The article emphasized that in
discussing this first stage, in footnote 9 of its decision, the Supreme Court
stated that "[if] a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect."277 Based on this
language, the article asserted that "the question of Chevron deference turns
not on congressional intent-as that phrase is commonly used-but rather
on whether Congress had an intention."278 Echoing the language of footnote
9 of Chevron (though rephrasing it somewhat), the article declared that "[i]f
271.

Feinstein Continues as General Counsel as Clinton Makes Recess Appointment,

205 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) AA-1 (October 23,1998) (identifying Mr. Yager's titles near the
time of the submission of his amicus brief in Bob Evans Farms); Justices Considering Five
Employment Cases, But No Labor Cases Yet This Term, 06 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) S-21
(January 10, 2(00) (identifying Mr. Yager's titles near the time of the submission of his
amicus brief in Efco).
272. See supra note 247.
273. Daniel V. Yager & Joseph 1. LoBue, Is the Chevron Standard Too High-Octane
for the NLRB?, 23 EMPWYEEREL. LJ. 67 (1998).
274. Id. at 76-80. The article's assertion was in fact erroneous, as the Supreme Court
has clearly decided that the Chevron standard does apply to Board decisions.
275. Id. at 72.
276. Id. at 70 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
277. Id. at 71 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
278. Id. (emphasis added).
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Congress had an intention, that intention is the law and it is the duty of the
judiciary to find and apply the law."279 Thus, when Congress had an
intention, review of an agency decision should be resolved at the first stage
of the Chevron analysis.
According to the article, courts would proceed to the second stage only
when "Congress had no intention."280 The article characterized these cases
where Congress "had no intention" as ones where "there exists no law to
find and apply."281 The article explained that in these circumstances where
there is no congressional intention and therefore "no law" an agency "with
rulemaking power can create law."282 The article contended that the second
stage of Chevron is designed for these "creations" of law, to detennine
whether they are "'pennissible' (that is, not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary
to the statute.)"283 But, the article reiterated, when law is not being created,
but already exists, then the second stage of the Chevron standard does not
apply: "[Chevron] deference is appropriate only with respect to the creation
of new law, not the application of existing law."284
The article contended that its "proposition that Chevron applies to
agency decisions that create new law, not those that interpret existing law"
was also supported by the Chevron decision's "lengthy discussion about the
accountability of the political branches of government. "285 The article
contended that deferring to the executive branch on accountability grounds
was appropriate "only if the policy choices at issue involve the creation of
new law, a task which the federal system has always entrusted to the
politically accountable branches of government."286 By contrast, the article
claimed, "the application of existing law" was "purposefully remove[d] from
the reach of the political branches" by "the constitutional scheme" and was
placed "in the hands of an independent judicial branch."287 Thus, the article
reasoned, it would be inappropriate for the "independent" courts to defer to
executive agencies in cases involving application of existing law. 288
279.

280.

281.
282.
283.
284.

285.
286.
287.

Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd. at 72.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd. at 72-73.

288. Indeed, the article asserted that it would be wrong for agencies or courts to take
account of "political" or "policy" considerations in adjudications. See Yager, supra note 273,
at 82 ("[T]he political influences found to be appropriate in Chevron can mean only that
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In addition to contending that the second stage of Chevron applied only
when agencies "created" (rather than interpreted or applied) law, the article
also asserted that such law "creation" could occur only through rulemaking.
The article argued that the second stage of Chevron applied only in instances
where "Congress intentionally or inadvertently does not create law in a
particular area."289 The article declared that "[i]n some of those instances,
Congress has authorized executive agencies to create law-that is, by
granting the agency rulemaking power."290 The article stressed that this
rulemaking process was distinguishable from "the process of determining
what existing law means."291 Relying on a paragraph in Chevron that
referred to "express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate ... the
statute by regulation" and to "legislative delegation,"292 the article argued
that "[i]t is the rulemaking power that brings Chevron deference."293
The article drew a hard line between rulemaking and adjudication. The
article maintained that "[u]nlike the prospective legislative rulemaking at·
issue in Chevron, however, agency adjudications involve the wholly
different process of applying existing law."294 The article quoted a 1947
Manual of the U.S. Attorney General that stated that "[r]ule making is
agency action which regulates future conduct" while "[c]onversely,
adjudication is concerned with the determination of past and present rights
and liabilities."295 The article also noted that in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co.296 several Supreme Court Justices had found that "a rule of law
announced in an adjudication could not be applied only prospectively."297
The article said this was true "because such rules are statements of what
existing law is, not what future law will be."298 The article asserted that
agency adjudications, by their very nature, involved application of existing
law: "agency adjudications ... are necessarily founded on the proposition

Chevron does not apply to agency adjudications."}; id. at 96 ("[A)djudication is not the
context in which political policy goals should be advanced.").
289. [d. at 70.
290. [d.
291. [d. at 71.
292. [d. at 72 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44).
293. [d. (citations omitted).
294. [d. at 81.
295. [d. (emphasis in original) (quoting ArrORNEY GENERAL OF 1HE UNITED STATES,
MANuAL ON TIlE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

296.
297.
298.

394 U.S. 759 (1969).
Yager, supra note 273, at 81.
[d.

13-14 (1947)).
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that there is existing law to apply."299 Thus, the article propounded,
adjudications (such as Board decisions) were a kind of agency decisionmaking that was wholly distinct from rulemaking and policymaking, and the
second prong of Chevron applied only to the rulemakinglpolicymaking
decisions.
As discussed above, this distinction between rulemaking and
adjudication was largely adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Bob Evans Farms
and the Fourth Circuit in Efco.3 00 The courts departed somewhat from the
article in finding that the line between rulemaking and adjudication was
blurred in some cases, where the Board promulgated its policies through an
adjudicative decision. But the courts held that such cases were rare, and that
most Board decision were on the "adjudicative" side of the
rulemakingladjudication line. And the courts agreed with the article that for
decisions on the adjudicative side of the line, courts did not have to apply
the deferential "second prong" of the Chevron standard.
B. Why the "Lesser Deference" Theory Is Invalid

The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that, for purposes of judicial
review, there is a meaningful distinction between adjudication and
rulemaking. In decisions issued within the past few years the Supreme Court
has resolved that the Chevron standard does apply to agency adjudications.
In its 2000 decision in Christensen v. Harris County,301 the Supreme Court
found that adjudications were entitled to Chevron deference. The petitioners
in that case argued that the Court should defer to a United States Department
of Labor opinion letter, but the Court held that such letters were not entitled
to Chevron deference. 302 In so holding, the Court expressly distinguished
opinion letters from adjudications, saying "[h]ere, however, we confront an
interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for
example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking."303 The
majority then explained that the basis for the distinction between rulemaking
and formal adjudication on the one hand, and on the other "[i]nterpretations
such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals and enforcement guidelines" was that the latter

299.

300.
301.
302.
303.

[d.
See supra notes 243-68 and accompanying text.

529 U.s. 576 (2000).
[d. at 586-88.
[d. at 587.
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"all ... lack the force of law."304 The majority then held that these agency
determinations that lack the force of law "do not warrant Chevron-style
deference."305 Thus, the Christensen majority strongly indicated that for
purposes of Chevron deference, formal adjudications and notice-andcomment rulemaking were equivalent, and were both entitled to Chevron
deference because they had "the force of law."
In 2001, in United States v. Mead Corp. ,306 previously discussed in Part
ill,307 the Supreme Court even more explicitly held that adjudications, like
rules, were entitled to Chevron deference. As discussed in Part ill, in Mead
Corp. the Supreme Court announced a new test for determining which types
of agency actions were covered by Chevron, a test that turned on whether
Congress had implicitly delegated lawmaking authority to the agency.308
The Court strongly endorsed authority to adjudicate as a factor favoring
Chevron deference, stating that "[d]elegation of such authority may be
shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice-and-comment ruiemaking,"309 and "[w]e have
recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment
in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of
rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which
deference is claimed."310 Thus, even more definitely than in its Christensen
decision, the Supreme Court equated adjudication and notice-and-comment
rulemaking for purposes of entitlement to Chevron deference.
In Mead Corp., the Supreme Court expressly recognized that Board
adjudications were among those that were qualified for Chevron deference.
The Court listed the prior decisions in which it had "appl[ied] Chevron
deference" to adjudications, and two of the eight decisions on that list were

304. [d.
305. [d. Interestingly, the majority held that "interpretations contained in formats such
as opinion letters" should be reviewed under the Skidmore standard, see Christensen, 529 U.S.
at 587 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 133, 140 (1944», which was the standard
that Yager & LoBue argued should be applied to NLRB adjudications. See Yager and LoBue,
supra note 273, at 95-96. Under the Skidmore standard, agency detenninations are not entitled
to any deference ''by reason of their authority," but courts can refer to them for "guidance"
and can follow them if they have "power to persuade." See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
306. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
307. See supra Part Ill.
308. See supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
309. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 227 (emphasis added).
310. [d. at 229.
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Supreme Court reviews of Board adjudications.3 11 Meanwhile, in another
2001 decision, NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.,312 the
Supreme Court again applied the Chevron standard to an NLRB adjudicative
decision. In Part II of Kentucky River, which was unanimous,313 the Court
held, "[t]wo aspects of the Board's interpretation are reasonable, and hence
controlling on this Court," and cited Chevron as support.3 14 Thus, in citing
to the pages of Chevron that set forth the two-pronged standard, and in
holding that a court must defer to the Board's "reasonable" interpretation of
a statute, an unanimous Supreme Court clearly applied the second prong of
the Chevron standard to adjudicative decisions by the Board and its
Regional Director.
These rulings by the Supreme Court illustrate that Yager and LoBue's
assertion that the second prong of Chevron does not apply to adjudications is
based on a misreading of the Chevron decision. Yager and LoBue explicitly
base their conclusion on two underlying premises: that there is a hard
distinction between "making law" and "applying law," and that
administrative agencies "make law" only through rulemaking. Both premises
are wrong.
With regard to the fIrst premise, the Chevron decision makes no
reference to a making law/applying law distinction, and does not even refer
to an agency performing the task of "making" a law or "applying" a law.
Instead, Chevron is wholly concerned with, and refers repeatedly to, the
agency task of "interpreting" or "construing" a statute. 315 Agency
311. [d. at 230 & n.12 (citing Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392 (1996) and
ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1994».
312. 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
313. Id. at 722, 730.
314. Id. at 713 (emph~is added) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44). For this
proposition, the Supreme Court also cited its prior decision in NLRB v. Town & Country
Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995). In Town & Country, the Supreme Court had stated, in
explaining its reasoning for upholding a Board decision, that "this Court's decisions recognize
that the Board often possesses a degree of legal leeway when it interprets its governing statute,
particularly where Congress likely intended an understanding of labor relations to guide the
Act's application" and the Court supported this reasoning with a "see also" cite to Chevron.
Town & Country, 516 U.S. at 89-90. Even before Kentucky River and Mead Corp., Professor
Dan Kahan cited Town & Country's reference to Chevron as proof that the Supreme Court
applied the Chevron standard to Board adjudications and to adjudications in general. Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 469, 502 & n.169
(1996).
315. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 ("When a court reviews an agency's
construction of a statute ... the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute."); id. at 844 ("[A] court may not substitu~e its
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interpretation of a statute often unites the "making law" and "applying law"
functions that Yager and LoBue posit are separate. An agency can, within
the same regulation or adjudicative decision, "make" law by developing a
new specific legal rule to effectuate the purposes of the statute and "apply"
law by utilizing an already existing specific legal rule that is clearly
contained in the statute. Chevron makes no distinction between different
kinds of statutory interpretation by agencies-whenever an agency interprets
a statute, Chevron applies.
Every Board decision is an exercise in statutory interpretation because in
every decision the Board is, at bottom, interpreting the National Labor
Relations Act. For example, in the Bob Evans case in which the Seventh
Circuit refused to grant Chevron deference to the Board's decision, the
Board had interpreted the meaning of the phrase "other concerted activities
for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection" in Section 7 of the Act. 316
And in Efco, the case in which the Fourth Circuit determined that the
Chevron standard should not be applied to the Board's decision, the Board
had interpreted two statutory provision, § 8(a)(2)'s prohibition on employer
domination of labor organizations and § 2(5)'s definition of the term "labor
organization. "317
Yager and LoBue's second key premise, that agencies make new law
only through rulemaking and not adjudication, is also erroneous. The
Supreme Court established, in its 1947 decision in SEC v. Chenery C07p.,318
that an administrative agency can promulgate a new standard through an
adjudicative proceeding rather than through a rulemaking. The Supreme
Court applied that rule to the National Labor Relations Board in 1974 in
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.319 In Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court held
that "the Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an
adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion."320

own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.").
316. See Bob Evans Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1012, 1019, 1020-21 (7th Cir.
1998) (explaining Board's ruling was based on its construction of Section 7 of the Act).
317. See Efco, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909, at *2 (4th Cir. May 17,2000).
318. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
319. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
320. [d. at 294. In their article, Yager and LoBue at one point acknowledge that
agencies have the "power" to make policy through adjudication, Yager & LoBue, supra note
273, at 86 & n.38 (citing Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267 (1974», but in the very next
paragraph they in effect withdraw that acknowledgment by declaring that "the type of policy

2002]

AFTER "HIDING THE BALL" IS OVER

575

Since Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court has never questioned that the
Board can make new law through its adjudicative decisions. 321 In fact, in its
1991 decision in Martin, Secretary of Labor v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission,322 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Board's
authority to make policy through its adjudications. In Martin, the Supreme
Court distinguished between agencies that possessed only "nonpolicymaking
adjudicatory powers," like the OSHRC and agencies that were authorized to
make policy through adjudication, with the National Labor Relations Board
given as an example. 323
The Supreme Court declared that for some agencies, "adjudication
operates as an appropriate mechanism not only for fact-finding, but also for
the exercise of delegated lawmaking powers, including lawmaking by
interpretation," and the Court immediately cited Bell Aerospace as the
leading example of policymaking adjudication,324 The Court explained that
in Bell Aerospace, "we concluded that agency adjudication is a generally
permissible mode of lawmaking and policymaking only because the unitary
agenc[y] in question [the Board] also had been delegated the power to make
law and policy through rulemaking."325 In Martin, the Supreme Court
reiterated that Congress delegated to the Board the authority to make policy,
and that the Board was free to engage in policymaking through adjudication.
Thus, Yager and LoBue's assertion that Board adjudications cannot involve
policymaking flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent and congressional
intent.
In Bob Evans and Efco, the Seventh Circuit and Fourth Circuit actually
acknowledged that the Board could make policy in its adjudications, and that
Chevron deference would be appropriate in such cases. 326 However, these
decisions made in an adjudication" cannot involve the making of new policy, but must be
limited to determining already existing law. ld. at 86.
321. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD 1. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE § 6.8, at 272-73 (1994) ("The Court has not even suggested that a court can
constrain an agency's choice between rulemaking and adjudication in any opinion since Bell
Aerospace. ").

322.

499 U.S. 144 (1991).

323.
324.

ld. at 154.
ld. (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292-94 (1974) and SEC v.

Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,201-203 (1947».
325. ld. (citing Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 292-294; Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
202-203 (1947); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78JlARv. L. REv. 921 (1965».
326. See Bob Evans Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1998); Efco
Corp. v. NLRB, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909, at *10-*11 (4th Cir. May 17,2000).
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courts asserted that the Board only "occasionally" made policy in its
adjudications, and that most Board decisions do not involve
policymaking. 327 In Bob Evans and Efco, the courts found that the Board
decisions they were reviewing were the typical ones in which there was little .
or no policymaking dimension, and therefore the Chevron standard was
inapplicable. 328
The Seventh and Fourth Circuits are far from the mark in asserting that
only "occasionally" does the Board make policy in its decisions. On the
contrary, the Board engages in policymaking in nearly all its decisions. As
noted earlier, in virtually all its decisions (and specifically in those that were
reviewed by the Seventh and Fourth Circuits), the Board interprets one or
more provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. 329 As discussed
previously, most of the provisions of that Act are phrased in general and
ambiguous terms,330 and so in most cases the Board is called upon to decide,
Congress has not spoken clearly and directly to the issue at hand. 331
In almost every case that comes before the Board, the Board must
decide, with the barest guidance from statutory language, whether the statute
grants employees or a union or an employer the "right" to do something,
whether the statute bars an employer or union from doing something or
requires an employer or union to do something, or whether when and under
what conditions a representation election should be held. The Seventh
Circuit in Bob Evans referred to such determinations as "resolving
competing claims under the statute," and called this a "classic judicial
exercise."332 The Supreme Court has more accurately recognized, and
repeatedly asserted, that resolving competing views of the statute is a
policymaking exercise, which Congress delegated to the Board: "The
function of striking [a] balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a
difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily
to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial
327. See Bob Evans, 163 F.3d at 1019 ("While the Board can, and occasionally does,
make rules in the course of adjudication, the bulk of its orders have only a slight legislative
dimension."); Efco, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909, at *11 ("Since the Board develops general
rules in the course of adjudication, there will invariably be occasions when a special degree of
deference is appropriate") (emphasis added)).
328. See Bob Evans, 163 F.3d at 1019-20; Efco, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909, at
*11-*12.
329. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 182-88,211-15 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
332. Bob Evans, 163 F.3d at 1020.
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review."333 As the Supreme Court has long rec~gnized, when the Board
decides how to apply the general language of the statute to specific
situations, the Board is performing its congressionally delegated role of
developing labor policy.3 34
The Bob Evans and Efco cases actually exemplify the policy nature of
Board decision-making. In each case, after the Seventh Circuit and Fourth
Circuit declared there was no policy dimension to the Board's decision, the
court went ahead and made a ruling that could only be characterized as a
policy judgment. In Bob Evans, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[t]he Act is
silent as to permissible forms of concerted activity,"335 thus acknowledging
that Congress had made no explicit decision as to what limits should be
placed on means of protest. The Seventh Circuit then imposed the limit that
the means of protest must be proportional to the grievance being
protested. 336 The court did not base this new limit on statutory language or
legislative history. Indeed, the court explicitly discounted statutory language
that contradicted its new rule. When the Board invoked § 13 of the Act,
which states that "[n]othing in this subchapter, except as specifically
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,"337 the Seventh Circuit
declared, "this provision notwithstanding, the right to engage in concerted
strike activity pursuant to Section 7 is not unlimited."338
The Seventh Circuit did not, and probably could not, justify its
proportionality rule based on statutory language. The court's addition of this
new limit was a policy choice, and the court expressly based it on policy
considerations. The court found that requiring proportionality was consistent
333. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, 353 U.S.
87,96 (1957), quoted in, NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1861, 1873
n.5 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Charles D. Bonanno Linen
Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 409 (1982); American Broad. Co. v. Writers Guild of
Am., W., 437 U.S. 411, 431 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
334. See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court
decisions affirming that the Board makes labor policy through its decisions). At one point
in Bob Evans, the Seventh Circuit appears to suggest that a Board decision is not a
policymaking decision unless the Board creates a "new rule." Bob Evans, 163 F.3d at 1019.
But it is absurd to hold that a rule is a "policy" and entitled to deference the first time it is
announced, but is never again entitled to deference when it is subsequently applied. Under
that logic, even an administrative regulation would receive Chevron deference only when it
was first promulgated, but not when it is subsequently enforced.
335.
336.

337.
338.

Id.
Id. at 1023-24.
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994).
Bob Evans, 163 F.3d at 1019 n.2 (emphasis added).
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with "the objectives of industrial hannony on which the National Labor
Relations Act rests. "339 The court observed its rule was supported by "the
conventional wisdom that preserves strike activity as a measure of last
resort,"340 thus elevating that "conventional wisdom" over the specific
statutory mandate in Section 13 that strikes should not be "impeded." Thus,
in Bob Evans, the Seventh Circuit created a new rule based on policy
justifications, an action that certainly must be called policymaking.
In Efco, the Fourth Circuit ruled on what in recent years has been one of
the most controversial policy issues in labor law: what kinds of employee
committees and other employee participation programs does § 8(a)(2) of the
Act prohibit. Only four years before Efco, Congress passed, and President
Clinton vetoed, a law to amend § 8(a)(2) in a way to lessen greatly the Act's
restriction on employers' ability to create or maintain employee participation
organizations. 341 Section 8(a)(2) forbids employers from dominating any
"labor organization,"342 and the Act defines "labor organization" in
typically general and ambiguous terms. 343 Over the years, the Board has had
to fill in the meaning of the vague language defining labor organization,
particularly the key phrase "dealing with."344
In Efco, the Fourth Circuit upheld the Board's ruling that Efco's
Employee Safety Committee, Employee Benefit Committee and Employee
Policy Review Committee met the Act's definition of "labor organizations"
and that Efco violated Section 8(a)(5) by creating and otherwise dominating
them. 345 In its short discussion in Efco of its reasons for finding the
committees to be labor organizations, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its
agreement with the Board's position that "dealing with" meant a '''bilateral
mechanism involving proposals from the employee committee ... coupled
ld. at 1022.
ld.
See H.R. 743 100th Congo (1995); 1995 S. 295 100th Congo (1995); see also
President Clinton's Veto Message, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.
339.
340.
341.

342. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2002).
343. Section 2(5) of the Act provides, "The term 'labor organization' means any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (2002).
344. See, e.g., Cabot Carbon Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1633 (1957), enforcement denied, 256
F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd and Board decision enforced, 360 u.S. 203 (1959) (leading
case on meaning of "dealing with").
345. Bfeo Corp. v. NLRB, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909, at *4-*9 (4th Cir. May 17,
2000).
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with real or apparent consideration of those proposals by management. "'346
The court in Efeo thus reaffInned a rule that was grounded largely in policy
assessments. In Eleetromation, in the footnote cited in Efeo, the Board had
justified this conception of dealing with as consistent with "the abuses
Congress meant to proscribe in enacting the Wagner Act."347 In Peninsula,
the case in which the Fourth Circuit first adopted the Board's definition of
"dealing with," the court explained it did so because
[w]e believe that, when properly applied, it recognizes an important point
concerning §§ 2(5) and 8(a)(2): "logic and experience under the Act ...
dictate that not all management efforts to communicate with employees
concerning company personnel policy are forbidden on pain of violating the
Act. An overly broad construction of the statute would be as destructive of
the objects [ot] the Act as ignoring the provision entirely."348

In Efeo, the Fourth Circuit decided a sensitive and controversial policy issue
by reaffirming its adoption of a Board standard that the Board had devised
based on policy factors and that the Fourth Circuit had originally adopted for
policy reasons. Hence, contrary to the court's assertion in Efeo that the
Board's decision "cannot be said to involve policy choices,"349 policy
judgments were actually at the heart of the Board's ruling.
In sum, the Seventh Circuit and Fourth Circuit are simply wrong in
asserting that most Board decisions are not entitled to Chevron deference.
These courts greatly underestimated the policymaking role that the Board
plays in its adjudicative decisions (while Yager and LoBue disregarded the
Board's role altogether). In fact, there is a significant policy aspect to nearly
every legal conclusion made by the Board in one of its adjudications, and
consequently virtually every Board decision is entitled to Chevron
deference.

346. ld. at *15-*16 (quoting NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 36 F.3d 1262,
1271 (4th Cir. 1994) and Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 n.21 (1992».
347. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 n.21, quoted in Efco, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
10909, at *15-*16 (4th CiT. May 17,2000».
348. Peninsula, 36 F.3d at 1272 (quoting NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer,
691 F.2d 288, 292 (6th CiT. 1982».
349. Efco, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909, at *12.
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V. THE NEW APPROACH NEEDED FROM THE BOARD: CONSTANT
EXPRESSION OF ITS POLICYMAKING ROLE
For many years, the Board has downplayed its role as a labor
policymaker. As Professor Joan Flynn has documented, the Board has often
concealed policy determinations by making them in the form of factfinding. 350 When the Board is not hiding its policymaking role, it is usually
ignoring it: in most of its decisions, the Board makes no reference to the fact
that it is making or reaffirming labor policy.
As Professor Flynn has suggested, the Board may have concealed or
soft-pedaled its policymaking in order to avoid judicial interference with its
policies. 351 The Board's approach may have helped it elude overt judicial
reversal of its policies, but it opened the way for courts to disregard the
Board's policy judgments in favor of their own. When the Board engages in
fact-finding, or makes any conclusion that a court can label as fact-finding,
Allentown Mack allows courts to overturn the Board's ruling on the ground
that the Board failed to draw the correct inferences. 352 Even when the Board
makes rulings that are unmistakably legal in nature, the Board's failure to
refer to them as policy determinations has enabled courts to declare that
most Board decisions do not involve policymaking and instead are "a classic
judicial exercise" that courts can perform as well as the Board. 353
The Board has, in effect, ceded to the appellate courts the primary role
in making labor relations policy, a position that Congress intended the Board
to fill.3 54 Indeed, the Board will have no lawmaking role at all if appellate
courts continue to disregard Board legal rulings and make the rulings they
prefer. In practical terms, the Board's review of a case would become a
meaningless intermediate step between the building of a record at an unfair
labor practice or representation hearing and the actual making of a decision
in the case, which would now be performed entirely by an appellate court.
For the Board to reverse this slide into irrelevance, the Board must
reclaim its preeminent policymaking authority by reasserting it. It is not
sufficient that the Board discuss its policymaking functions, as it now does,

350.
351.
352.

See supra notes 95-136 and accompanying text.
See Flynn, supra note 4, at 413-18,442-46.
See supra notes 141-70 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Allentown

Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
353. See Efco, 2000 U.S. App. LEX IS 10909, at *12; Bob Evans Farms, Inc. v.
NLRB, 163 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998).
354.

See supra Part 1I1.A.
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only in cases where the Board is making a major change in a legal rule.3 55
Instead, even in decisions where the Board is just reaffirming prior
precedent, even in what the Board may regard as "routine" cases, the Board
should invoke its policymaking function. In decision after decision, the
Board should announce that its ruling is based on policy considerations and
its responsibility to "fill gaps" in the National Labor Relations Act.
From time to time since the 1960s, scholars have recommended that the
Board more openly and fully articulate the policy reasons for its
decisions.3 56 For Professors Estreicher and Winter, the objective of their
recommendation was to improve the quality of Board decision-making, not
to preserve the Board's policymaking role vis-a-vis the courts. Indeed, both
Professor Estreicher and Professor Winter envisioned the appellate courts as
enhancing the Board's policymaking function by compelling the Board,
through remands and other devices, to explain the policy rationales for its
decisions.3 57 In her 1995 article, Professor Flynn called this the "articulation
requirement" and described it as "the Board clearly articulat[ing] both what
its policy is and why that policy is an appropriate one in light of the
underlying purposes of the Act and the Board's understanding of the
practicalities of the situation."358 But Professor Flynn ultimately rejected
adoption of the articulation requirement; while she expressed belief it would
be appropriate in an "ideal-world scenario,"359 she concluded that in the real
355. See supra note 176 (identifying recent decisions in which the Board relied on
policy considerations to overrule precedent). One of these decisions actually illustrates the
advantages to the Board of explicitly relying on policy considerations: The Board's policy
change in Epilepsy Foundation ofN.E. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 92, 2000 WL 967066 (2000)
was upheld in Epilepsy Found. of N.E. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The
D.C. Circuit, in affirming .the Board's policy ruling, specifically relied on Chevron deference
in holding that it could not reverse a Board policy judgment as long as it was rational. The
court explained: "[T]he rationale underlying the decision in this case is both clear and
reasonable. That is all that is necessary to gamer deference from the court. 'When a challenge
to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the
wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left
open by Congress, the challenge must fail.' The [employer's] challenge here is merely an
attack on the wisdom of the agency's policy, and, therefore. the challenge must fail." Id. at
1102 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,866
(1984)).
356. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, The Second Circuit and the NLRB 1980-81: A Case
Study in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 48 BROOK. L. REv. 1063, 1065 (1982); Winter,
supra note 183, at 69.
357.

358.
359.

See id.
Flynn, supra note 4,
Id. at 430-32.

at 430.
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world "ball hiding" was a rational means for the Board to protect its
policyrnaking from appellate courts that likely were hostile to the premises
of the National Labor Relations Act.3 6O
After Allentown Mack, hiding the ball is no longer available as a means
for the Board to protect its policies from judicial reversal. Whenever the
Board presents itself as engaging only in fact-finding, appellate courts can,
and do, overturn any Board finding with which they disagree.3 61 In this new
context, the Board's open assertion and explanation of its policymaking no
longer increases the Board's exposure to judicial interference because the
Board is completely exposed anyway.
Admittedly, open policyrnaking by the Board would not insulate it from
judicial reversal. As a practical matter, given the nature of the appellate
process, appellate courts always have the potential of overriding the Board's
legal positions and imposing their own. The best the Board can do is to
reduce the likelihood that appellate courts will overturn its decisions. The
way the Board has done that in the past is by "hiding" its policy decisions so
that courts wOllld tend to overlook them as candidates for reversal. Now,
after Allentown Mack, courts are as likely to scrutinize and reverse an
ostensibly "nonpolicymaking" decision as an overtly policymaking one.
Given the Board is now left without means to reduce the likelihood of
judicial scrutiny, the Board's best option is to reduce the likelihood that
courts will decide to reverse the decisions they do scrutinize. And that
means Board decisions should be made in a way that maximizes the
difficulty to appellate courts of reversing them.
The best way for the Board to do that is to emphasize its policymaking
authority in its decisions. When the Board makes a policy decision, an
appellate court faces significant legal hurdles in reversing it. The court must
overcome the fact that it was the intent of Congress, repeatedly reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court, that the Board predominate over courts in fashioning
labor policy. 362 When the Board is making a policy based on an ambiguous
provision of the Act, as it usually would be,363 the reviewing court also is
constrained by the Chevron standard to defer to the Board's decision as long
as it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. For these reasons,
360. See id. at 441-46.
361. See supra Parts II.C. and 11.0. (explaining how Allentown Mack enables courts to
reverse any Board finding with which they disagree and discussing examples of court
decisions that have relied on Allentown Mack to do so).
362. See supra notes 189-207 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 182-88,211-15 and accompanying text (explaining that the Act
is mostly written in vague and general\anguage).
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the Board is in its strongest position relative to the appellate courts when it
makes a policy determination; under Allentown Mack, the Board's relative
position is greatly weakened if the reviewing court can characterize the
Board's ruling as fact-finding. For the Board, the choice could not be more
clear: whenever possible, it should strengthen its hand by asserting that it is
rendering a policy decision.
How should the Board go about asserting its policymaking authority in
its decisions? The specific means used will, of course, vary from issue to
issue. But there are some general approaches that probably would be useful.
On some issues, there are implicit policy considerations that lay just below
the surface of the Board's decision, and the Board would simply have to state
those considerations explicitly. For example, as discussed in Part II,
Professor Flynn identified several policy considerations that probably
motivated the Board to adopt the position that it will not presume whether
striker replacements support a union. The next time the Board has occasion
to apply that rule, the Board should openly identify those policies as the
bases for it.
On many issues, it is very common for the Board to do nothing more in
explaining a ruling than to assert it (often saying it is "well-established" or
"well-settled") and then cite one or two cases as precedent for it. 364 In such
cases, the Board should add discussions of policy rationales for its rulings.
In many of these cases, the Board offers little support for its decision even
though it is making rulings that are particularly vulnerable to judicial
overruling. For example, in Supervalu, Inc., 365 the Board declared, based on
citation to two precedents, that it was "well-established" that employees on
sick or disability leave are presumed eligible to vote in a representation
election. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.,366 the Board asserted, again
364. For examples just from the year 2001, see Local 282, Int'l Bhd. of Tearnsters, 335
N.L.R.B. No. 98, 2001 WL 1149039 (2001) (ruling that union has a right to seek uniformity
in wages in an industry); New Mexico Symphony Orchestra, 335 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2001 WL
1022054 (2001) (ruling that employer's failure to make contractually required benefit
contributions is an illegal unilateral modification of an agreement); Dobbs Int'l Servs., 335
N.L.R.B. No. 78, 2001 WL 1110342 (2001) (rulings on imputing knowledge and actions of
supervisors to employer); Robert Orr-Sysco Food Servs., 334 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 2001 WL
910764 (2001) (ruling that photographing or videotaping employees engaged in union activity
violates Section 8(a)(1» .
. 365. 328 N.L.R.B. 52 (1999) (citing Red Arrow Freight Lines, 278 N.L.R.B. 965
(1986); Pepsi-Cola Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1995».
366. 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1061 n.3 (1998) (citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 314
N.L.R.B. 683, 683 (1994); Holo-Krome Co., 302 N.L.R.B. 452, 454 (1991», enforced, 237
F.3d 639 (D.C. Cir. 2001), reversed on other grounds, 122 Sup. Ct. 1275 (2002).
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based only on a citation to two cases, that an employer's offer of
reinstatement will toll the accrual of back pay only when the offer is
"specific, unequivocal and unconditional." As fmdings of fact, both these
rulings are questionable because the issues (whether an employee on leave is
likely to return to work, whether an employee should have recognized an
employer's statement as an offer of reinstatement) actually depend on the
circumstances of each individual employee. Especially after Allentown
Mack, a court could reject the application of the general rule to a case
because it draws the "wrong inference" given the facts of that particular
case. If the Board made clear these rules were policy judgments, however,
based on policy considerations (e.g., that employees on leave should not be
rendered ineligible because leave is subject to manipulation by an employer,
that employers should be encouraged to make firm and unconditional offers
of reinstatement to avoid disputes and employee misunderstandings), then
courts would have to defer to the rules as long as they were rational.
The Board also fails to offer fuller justification for its rulings even when
faced with opposition by one of its own Members, or by courts. For
example, in National Steel Corp.,367 Member Hurtgen contended in his
dissent that the employer's confidentiality concerns justified its failure to
provide the union with information about its hidden surveillance cameras. 368
The majority's only response was that it would "adhere to precedent" that
the burden is on the employer to "seek an accommodation" between its
confidentiality concerns and the interest of the union. 369
Even when appellate courts have expressed disapproval of a Board
position, the Board often reasserts it with no more justification than citation
to a couple of Board precedents. For example, even though several appellate
courts have held that § 8(c) of the Act prevents the Board from relying on
lawful anti-union speech as evidence of animus in a § 8(a)(3) discrimination
case,370 the Board in Sunrise Health Care Corp.371 simply restated that
protected employer speech could be used "as background evidence of
antiunion animus" and offered no justification for that position other than
citation to a couple of precedents. 372 Similarly, even after a circuit split
367.
368.
369.
370.

335 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 2001 WL 1033825 (2001).
[d. at *4.
[d. at *3.
See Rebecca Hanner White, The Statutory and Constitutional limits of Using

Protected Speech as Evidence of Unlawful Motive Under the National Labor Relations Act.,
53 OmoST. L.J. 1(1992).
371. 334 N.L.R.B. No. 111,2001 WL 888293 (2001).
372. [d. at *2.
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developed over which side bore the burden of proof regarding whether an
employee was or was not a supervisor,373 the Board in numerous cases
simply asserted its position that the burden rested on the party who claimed
an employee was a supervisor, without offering any explanation or support
other than (occasionally) citation to one or two Board precedents. 374 It fell
to the Supreme Court to articulate rationales for the Board's position when
the Court upheld it in NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc. 375
In all these cases where the Board relies only on citations to its own
precedents to support its legal rulings, the Board could readily supplement
those citations with policy rationales. For guidance on how to do that, the
Board could look to the too-rare decisions where the Board. does explain the
policy reasons for its legal doctrines. For example, in Detroit
Newspapers,376 the Board majority, apparently goaded by a dissent by
Member Liebman, offered policy justifications for adhering to its position
that employers can unilaterally change the employment terms of striker
replacements. The Board's Keystone Shipping Co.377 decision illustrates
373. Compare NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 987 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding that in unfair labor practice cases, the General Counsel has the burden of
disproving supervisory status), with NLRB v. Bakers of Paris, Inc., 929 F.2d 1427, 1445 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that "burden of proving supervisory status rests upon the party asserting
it").
374. See, e.g., Coventry Health Center, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 2000 WL 1369711
(2000); Carlisle Engineered Products, Inc., 330 N.L.R.B. 1359 (2000); Elmhurst Extended
Care Facilities, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 535 (1999); Benchmark Mechanical Contractors, 327
N.L.R.B. 829 (1999).
375. 121 S. Ct. 1861 (2001). The Supreme Court stated:
The Board's rule is supported by "the general rule of statutory construction that the
burden of proving justification or exemption under a special exception to the
prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its benefits." The Act's
definition of "employee," § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), ''ceiterate[s] the breadth of the
ordinary dictionary definition" of that term, so that it includes "any 'person who
works for another in return for financial or other compensation.'" Supervisors would
fall within the class of employees, were they not expressly excepted from it. The
burden of proving the applicability of the supervisory exception . . . should thus fall
on the party asserting it. In addition, it is easier to prove an employee's authority to
exercise 1 of the 12 listed supervisory functions than to disprove an employee's
authority to exercise any of those functions, and practicality therefore favors placing
the burden on the party asserting supervisory status. We find that the Board's rule for
allocating the burden of proof is reasonable and consistent with the Act, and we
therefore defer to it.
121 S. Ct. at 1866 (citations omitted).
376. 327 N.L.R.B. 871, 871·72 (1999).
377. 327 N.L.R.B. 892, 895 (1999).
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that the Board's explanations need not be lengthy or complicated: in that
case, the Board briefly rehearsed the reasons behind its presumption that
bargaining units of seagoing personnel are fleet-wide in scope.
For some of the Board's longest-standing legal doctrines, particularly
regarding what types of employer conduct constitute illegal "interference"
under § 8(a)(1), the Board simply finds a violation without citing any
precedent at all. 378 As discussed in Part II, empirical studies have
questioned whether well-established § 8(a)(1) violations like interrogation or
surveillance actually "interfere" with employee union activities or
attitudes.3 79 Particularly in light of these studies, it would be easy for
appellate courts to overrule regularly Board findings of such violations by
treating them as "erroneous factual inferences" under Allentown Mack,380 or
non-policymaking legal conclusions under Bob Evans Farms or Efco. 381 To
preserve its rules that employer actions like interrogation, surveillance,
solicitation of employee grievances, and so on are § 8(a)(1) violations, the
Board could expressly invoke the policy considerations that led the Board to
declare such conduct illegal in the first place. With regard to surveillance,
for example, the Board could rely on its very first published decision,
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,382 in which the Board found that
[t]he maintenance of open surveillance of the union meeting of employees is
a vicious form of restraint and coercion, especially when coupled as here with
threats of discharge, for it has the obvious intent and effect of placing the
employees in fear of their jobs because of their activity in connection with the
union. 383

378. To review examples from just a single N.L.R.B. volume, see, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 2001 WL 1149041 (2001) (interrogation); Villa Maria
Nursing & Rehab. Center, 335 N.L.R.B. No. 99, 2001 WL 1158837 (2001) (surveillance);
Sodexho Mariott Servs., Inc., 335 NLRB No. 43, 2001 WL 1022052 (2001) (interrogation
and creating impression of surveillance); Chariot Marine Fabricators & Indus. Corp., 335
N.L.R.B. No. 30, 2001 WL 1006054 (2001) (surveillance and creating impression of
surveillance); Yuker Constr. Co., 335 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 2001 WL 1011925 (2001)
(interrogation and creating impression of surveillance); L.W.D., Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. No. 24,
2001 WL 1006053 (2001) (interrogation).
379. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 90-93 and 141-70.
381. See supra Part IV. A.
382. 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935).
383. Id. at 22.
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Taking interrogation as an example, the Board could invoke the reasons it
discussed in its 1949 decision in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co.,384 where
the Board justified its proscription of interrogation with detailedreasons.3 85
The Board is by no means limited to relying on its past policy
justifications to support its legal rulings. Indeed, the imperative that the
Board assert the policy bases for it decisions fits well with the objective
expressed by Board members, referred to in the introduction, of ensuring
that the Board adapt to keep pace with changes in the American economy,
workplace, workforce and employer-employee relations. 386 As various
384. 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949).
385. The Board stated:
Interrogation by an employer not only invades the employee's privacy and thus
constitutes interference with his enjoyment of the rights guaranteed to him by the Act.
Its effect on the questioned employee, like that of open surveillance of union activity,
is to "restrain" or to "coerce" the employee in the exercise of those rights. The
employee who is interrogated concerning matters which are his sole concern is
reasonably led to believe that his employer not only wants information on the nature
and extent of his union interests and activities but also contemplates some form of
reprisal once the information is obtained. The finger which espionage might merely
direct to him is actually pointed at him by the inquiry from his employer. He fears
that a refusal to answer or a truthful answer may cost him his job. He is also in effect
warned that any contemplated union activity must be abandoned, or he will risk loss
of his job. Weighing these "subtle imponderables," the Board early characterized
direct interrogation as "a particularly flagrant form of intimidation of individual
employees." The Board assumed the violation "obvious." Many courts did
likewise ... Our experience demonstrates that the fear of subsequent discrimination
which interrogation instills in the minds of employees is reasonable and
well-founded. The cases in which interrogated employees have been discharged or
otherwise discriminated against on the basis of information obtained through
interrogation are numerous. These cases demonstrate conclusively that, by and large,
employers who engage in this practice are not motivated by idle curiosity, but rather
by a desire to rid themselves of union adherents. In prohibiting interrogation,
therefore, we are not only preserving the employees' right to privacy in their union
affairs; we are not only removing a subtle but effective psychological restraint on
employees' concerted activities; but we are also seeking to prevent the commission of
the further unfair labor practice of discrimination by condemning one of the first
steps leading to such discrimination.
Id. at 1360-62.
386. See Susan J. McGolrick, NLRB: Four Current Members Discuss Their Views on
Major Rulings, Criticism, Future Issues, 154 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-l (Aug. 10,2001);
Susan J. McGolrick, NLRB: Board Members, Labor Attorneys Discuss Current State, Future
of NLRB at Symposium, 87 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-1 (May 4, 2001); Drew Douglas,
Liebman Says Reducing Delays, Maintaining Workplace Relevance are NLRB's Challenges,
58 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 8-1 (March 24, 2000); Susan J. McGolrick, NLRB: Fox, Hurtgen
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issues present themselves in cases before the Board, the Board can and
should evaluate whether it still makes policy sense to apply established rules
to resolve those issues. In evaluating a legal rule, the Board must determine
whether, in light of current economic and workplace circumstances, that rule
furthers the policies of the Act. Where the Board decides it does, the Board
should clearly and fully explain why. And when the Board decides that
changed circumstances have rendered a rule ineffective in promoting the
Act's policies, then the Board should fashion a new rule that will serve those
policies.
The project outlined for the Board, of explicating policy grounds for all
its rulings, is unquestionably an ambitious and demanding one. By
expending the time and effort to explicitly make and explain policy in all or
most of its decisions, the Board can reclaim its function as the leading
policymaker in labor relations. Then, the Board would again fulfill the role
that Congress intended it to play.

Discuss Board Turnover, Backlog, Changes in Modem Workplace. 100 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) C-l (May 25, 1999).

